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"Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a
Woman's Tort Liability for Prenatal
Injuries to her Child Born Alivet
RON BEAL*
Now that the courts are recognizing the right of a fetus to be
protected from the negligence of others, it is only a short step to
allow a fetus to recover for negligent prenatal care. This article
discusses how the recognition of prenatal injury recovery and the
demise of the parental immunity doctrine present a dilemma to
the courts in choosing between the child's right to be born free of
injuries and a woman's right to control her own body.
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court recently cast this nation's vote in favor of a
mother's right to privacy as against a child's right to life before birth. But
the court did not deal with societal concern for the quality of a fetal life not
aborted. It appears then that society may still recognize the right of a child
to begin life with a sound mind and body, the right to be well born."
It would be difficult to set forth an argument that a child does not
have the right, to the fullest extent possible, to be born with a sound
mind and body. In fact, the medical profession recognizes the fetus
as an individual patient, in addition to its mother, as it relates to
prenatal care.2 In tort law, many states have recognized the individ-
f A major portion of this article was completed at Temple University School of
Law during my tenure as an Abraham Freedman Fellow. I would like to thank Dean
Carl Singley, Professor Anthony J. Bocchino for his critique of this article, and Ruby
Smiley for her patience and excellent secretarial skills.
* Professor of Law at Baylor University School of Law, Waco, Texas.
1. Ament, The Right to Be Well Born, 2 J. LEGAL MED. Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 24,
25.
2. J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, WILLIAMS OBsTETRics at vii (16th ed. 1980).
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ual status of the prenatal infant.'
Since 1946, state courts have made a dramatic change in the com-
mon law by recognizing that a child born alive may recover for inju-
ries sustained as a viable fetus4 caused by the negligence of another.5
Some courts have gone further and allowed recovery for injuries oc-
curring while the fetus is in a nonviable state6 or even for negligent
acts committed prior to conception which result in injuries to the
developing fetus at a later time.7
These developments, taken in conjunction with the abrogation of
the common law doctrine of parental immunity by a majority of the
states,8 may force a direct confrontation between a woman's right to
control her own body and the child's right to be well born. The po-
tential legal framework for lawsuits by children born alive for prena-
tal injuries caused by the negligent conduct of their mothers has
been unknowingly created by the state courts.
In Grodin v. Grodin,9 the intermediate appellate court of Michi-
gan recognized this potential by allowing a child to sue his mother
for prenatal injuries.10 In acknowledging the woman's duty, and that
a breach of that duty may result in liability to her child,", the
Grodin decision recognized a cause of action which may have a dra-
matic impact upon a woman's ability to control her own body, free
from judicial sanction.
This article will examine four issues. First, the law concerning the
ability of children born alive to recover for prenatal injuries will be
reviewed. Second, an analysis will be made of the law concerning
parental immunity as it affects the potential lawsuits of children
against their mothers. Third, the current medical literature will be
examined to determine whether an expert witness can establish a
3. See infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
4. Viability has been defined to denote the time when a fetus has a reasonable
potential for subsequent survival if it was removed from the womb. J. PRITCHARD & P.
MACDONALD, supra note 2, at 587.
5. See infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
7. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 357, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255(1977); Bergstresser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22, 26 (8th Cir. 1978) (interpreting Missouri
law); Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Lab. Inc., 483 F.2d 237, 240-41, (10th Cir. 1973)
(interpreting Oklahoma law). But see Albala v. City of New York, 54 N.Y.2d 269, 274,
429 N.E.2d 786, 788-89, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108, 110 (1981).
8. From 1884 until 1963, the vast majority of state courts accepted the theory
that a parent could not be held personally liable to her unemancipated child if her negli-
gence caused the child to be injured. See infra note 51 and accompanying text. In the
last twenty years, however, an increasing number of courts have either totally or partially
abrogated the doctrine of parental immunity. See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying
text. To date, no state court of last resort has considered the impact of the abrogation of
parental immunity as it might apply to prenatal torts.
9. 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980).
10. Id. at 400, 301 N.W.2d at 871.
11. Id.
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cause and. effect relationship between prenatal care by a woman and
the occurrence of physical and mental defects in children. Finally,
the potential child versus mother lawsuits for prenatal injuries will
be analyzed to determine if the courts will be able to delineate a
legally sound definition of a woman's duty to her potential child.12
PRENATAL INJURIES
Historical Background of Prenatal Torts
Dietrich v. Northampton's was the first decision in the United
States which considered the question of whether recovery would be
allowed for the negligent infliction of prenatal injuries. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes set forth the legal reasoning and justifications for
the denial of recovery.
Dietrich was a wrongful death case asserted on behalf of a child
who did not sustain personal injuries, but who was born prematurely
due to the injuries sustained by the mother.1 4 The legal basis of the
cause of action was a statute allowing any "person" to maintain an
action against the negligent party by an administrator for the loss of
one's life. 1 5 The child "survived" approximately ten or fifteen min-
utes after birth in the sense that the child exhibited motion in its
limbs for that period of time. 6
Justice Holmes stated that the issue before the court was whether
the child could have been said to have become a person recognized
by the law as capable of having locus standi in court. He held that
such recognition could not be accorded to an unborn child who was
part of the mother at the time that the injury was sustained. 7 This
was Justice Holmes' analysis even though he assumed that a person
may owe a civil duty to a fetus and thereby incur a "conditional
12. This article will restrict its analysis to the unemancipated child born alive as-
serting a cause of action against its mother for the negligent infliction of prenatal inju-
ries. The possible liability of the father for his actions toward the fetus is beyond the
scope of this article. If any such liability will ever be recognized, it will most assuredly be
an outgrowth of the development of a mother's liability. Any discussion of a wrongful
death cause of action for a child born alive who subsequently dies or for the stillborn
fetus is also beyond the scope of this discussion. Additionally, the intriguing area of
wrongful life causes of action may someday relate to this area, but are better left for the
proper time, if and when the cause of action analyzed in this article receives widespread
recognition.
13. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
14. Id. at 15.
15. Id. at 14.
16. Id. at 15.
17. Id. at 16.
prospective liability" in tort to one not yet in being. s
The essence of Justice Holmes' opinion was that the fetus was a
part of his mother and did not possess his own legal personality, i.e.,
the fetus simply did not exist from a legal viewpoint.1 9 However,
based upon the sketchy facts of the case, it is unclear on exactly
what grounds Justice Holmes based this opinion.
As a general rule, "legal personality," Le., the conferring of legal
rights upon a person which can be asserted in a court of law, begins
at birth. But in some areas of the law, such as property law, rights
have been held to vest in the infant while in utero provided it is
subsequently born alive and if such vesting is of benefit to the in-
fant.20 Thus the "legal fiction" was created that a child in utero, if
born alive, would be deemed to have already been born if it would be
to its advantage. In other words, the child was deemed to have a
conditional legal personality. 21
If the facts in Dietrich were that the child in fact lived for ten to
fifteen minutes, then the concept of legal personality would have
vested in the child at birth, and the child should have been deemed a
person under the statute. Therefore, if Justice Holmes denied relief
on grounds of a lack of legal personality, he redefined that concept
and adopted the untenable proposition that even after one is ac-
corded legal personality and the right to sue for one's wrongful
death, that legal capacity is conditioned on one's ability to survive
after a live birth.22
However, the legal commentators and the courts which followed
the Dietrich approach appear to have interpreted the decision as a
rejection of the civil law "birth for benefit" approach. The decision is
seen as an acceptance of the biological view that the unborn child
has no separate existence and is merely part of the mother. The logi-
cal conclusion is that there can be no cause of action on the infant's
behalf, but only on behalf of the mother.28
Justice Holmes' view was predicated on a medical basis which was
arguably known to be unsound at the time of the decision. 4 His view
18. Id. at 15.
19. Id. at 17.
20. Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L. REV. 579, 582 (1965).
21. Pace, Civil Liability for Pre-Natal Injuries, 40 MOD. L. REv. 141, 141
(1977).
22. Gordon, supra note 20, at 588.
23. Pace, supra note 21, at 141-42.
24. "The unpredictable, post-estatic moment when a chance-selected sperm meets,joins, and penetrates an equally chance-chosen human ovum, is never marked by any
recognizable sign. . . .Yet at that precise instant there is set in motion a most unbeliev-
ably automatic precision-controlled, multibillion-numbered series of cell divisions, dif-
ferentiations, and interorientations." 5B LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL
INJURIES AND ALLIED SPECIALTIES § 37A.2, at 158 (rev. vol. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA]. See also W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 55 at 336
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has been labeled Justice Holmes' "entity theory." His view denies a
separate recovery on behalf of the child on the hypothesis that the
mother and fetus are one.25 Even though this is apparently contra-
dictory to Justice Holmes' assumption of a legal duty to the fetus,
the most widely accepted reasoning is that traditional tort law re-
quires that a duty be owed to a determinate person. That person can
only be the woman, since the fetus does not exist but is a mere part
of the woman.26
State courts adhered to the Dietrich decision for the next seventy-
nine years and refused to recognize a cause of action for prenatal
injuries to a child subsequently born alive.2 7 A major change oc-
curred with the celebrated District of Columbia decision in Bonbrest
v. Kotz.2 8 Bonbrest was the first decision to directly challenge and
reject the reasoning of Justice Holmes.29
Consistent with the concerns of the courts in parental immunity
cases, the court in Bonbrest noted that the general rule of tort law is
to allow a remedy where a wrong has occurred. What could be more
sacrosanct, the court reasoned, than the right of the individual to the
enjoyment of life with the full use and possession of his limbs and
body?30 The justices noted the civil law doctrine of "birth for bene-
fit" and could not justify deeming a fetus a human being under the
civil law, but a non-entity under the common law. 1
The Bonbrest opinion turned to the problem of the difficulty of
proof which has been previously identified by legal scholars as the
very issue which caused the courts initially to refuse to recognize the
cause of action.3 2 The court held this concern to be irrelevant to rec-
ognizing the cause of action. Rather, the difficulty of proof was prop-
erly a concern of the trial court in determining on a case-by-case
(4th ed. 1971).
25. Comment, Wrongful Death and the Unborn: An Examination of Recovery Af-
ter Roe v. Wade, 13 J. FAM. L. 99, 101 (1973-74).
26. Comment, Legal Duty to the Unborn Plaintiff. Is There a Limit?, 6 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 217, 218 (1978).
27. Note, Preconception Negligence: Reconciling an Emerging Tort, 67 GEO. L.J.
1239, 1245 (1979).
28. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
29. But see Korman v. Hagen, 165 Minn. 320, 206 N.W. 650 (1925). The Minne-
sota Supreme Court allowed a cause of action for injuries sustained by a child during
delivery. The issue was not even presented to the court whether the "child" was a fetus
or a living child at the time the injuries were sustained. See also White, The Right of
Recovery for Prenatal Injuries, 12 LA. L. REV. 383, 387 n.17 (1952).
30. 65 F. Supp. at 141-42.
31. Id. at 140-41.
32. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
basis whether the plaintiff had sustained his burden of proof."3
A major portion of the opinion was an attack on Justice Holmes'
"entity theory" which the court recognized as biologically unsound.
Yet, its decision instituted a new controversy regarding viability
which haunts the courts today. The facts before the court concerned
injuries sustained by a viable fetus. The court held that modern med-
ical literature considered a viable fetus to be a separate entity capa-
ble of independent life. The law had not been keeping pace with
medical and scientific progress; Holmes' "entity theory," as it con-
cerned a viable fetus, could not stand. A viable fetus injured and
subsequently born alive had a right to sue for its prenatal injuries.3 4
The majority of state courts followed Bonbrest"5 and the viability
standard it used. 36 Legal commentators applauded the state courts'
willingness to allow a cause of action for an injury to a viable fetus
subsequently born alive, but there has been an almost universal con-
demnation of the courts' stopping at the point of viability. It has
been criticized because the viability concept is an indeterminate con-
cept depending upon the individual development of a specific fetus
and there is no way to actually know if a particular fetus is viable
unless it is immediately born. 7
In attacking this legal theory the viability standard has been criti-
cized as merely an attempt to circumvent the precedent of Holmes'
"entity theory" instead of formulating a new rule. The criticism ze-
ros in on the true issue of public policy that the degree of fetal devel-
opment at the time of the injury should have no bearing on whether
the plaintiff was an entity to whom the alleged tortfeasor owed a
duty.38 If we recognize that natural justice allows one to be born
with a healthy mind and body, it is an uncontrovertible fact that the
process of nature has been irrevocably set in motion at the time of
conception, and an injury after that point in time will lead to a per-
son in being who will be permanently affected by the injuries
33. 65 F. Supp. at 142-43.
34. Id.
35. Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1222, 1227 (1971).
36. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 368, 56 N.E. 638, 640 (1900)
(Boggs, J. dissenting), overruled by Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 432, 114 N.E.2d 412,
417-18 (1953). In dissenting from the Illinois Supreme Court's holding denying recovery
for prenatal injuries, Justice Boggs eloquently referred to the concept of natural justice
that requires an infant to be allowed to recover for injuries sustained as a fetus. Only six
years after Dietrich, Justice Boggs pointed out that a viable fetus was not considered a
part of the mother. He reasoned that if a child could be removed from its mother and
survive by natural or artificial means, it should be able to recover for injuries sustained
during that period of time even though not born until completion of the normal cycle of
gestation.
37. Note, Parental Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PRons.
47, 56 (1978).
38. Note, supra note 27, at 1247.
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sustained.3 9
Current Status of the Recognition of Prenatal Injury Recovery
Three jurisdictions apparently remain in the shadow of the Die-
trich decision and do not recognize recovery for prenatal injuries. 40
As indicated, the majority of states have rejected Dietrich and fol-
lowed the District of Columbia's reasoning in Bonbrest. As of this
writing, of the states which have been confronted with the specific
issue of whether a cause of action may be maintained for prenatal
injuries sustained by a child subsequently born alive, nine states have
allowed recovery for injuries sustained from the time of conception,41
and eleven states have allowed it from the point of viability.' 2 Fifteen
39. White, supra note 29, at 395-96.
40. Nebraska has never been confronted with the specific issue of whether a child
born alive can recover for prenatal injuries, but has only discussed the issue in the con-
text of the wrongful death of a fetus. In Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 22, 50
N.W.2d 229, 232 (1951), the Nebraska Supreme Court held that as to wrongful death
actions, it "adhere[d] to the rule that an unborn child is a part of the mother until birth,
and as such, has no judicial existence." Interestingly, the court specifically mentioned
that the issue of prenatal recovery for a child born alive was not before it, and it would
leave the determination of that issue to a time when it arose in an adversary context. See
also Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573, 576, 260 N.W.2d 480, 482 (1977). Arizona has
only been confronted with a prenatal injury recovery when interpreting the right of re-
covery of a stillborn infant under the wrongful death statute. This case did not reach the
Supreme Court. Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 554, 529 P.2d 706, 707 (1975) (no
wrongful death cause of action for a viable fetus). It can only be assumed Arizona has
not recognized any type of prenatal injury cause of action. Virginia was presented with
the same fact situation and reached a similar conclusion. Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co.,
210 Va. 138, 142, 169 S.E.2d 440, 441 (1969) (no wrongful death action for stillborn
child).
41. Wolfe v. Isbell, 291 Ala. 327, 333-34, 280 So. 2d 758, 763 (1973); Simon v.
Mullin, 34 Conn. Supp. 139, 147, 380 A.2d 1353, 1357 (1977); Day v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. 328 So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe
Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 504-5, 93 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1956); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp.,
67 Ill. 2d 348, 357, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (1977); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483,
486, 147 A.2d 108, 110 (1958); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 367, 157 A.2d 497, 504
(1960); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 273-74, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960); Sylvia v.
Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 79, 220 A.2d 222, 224 (1966). But see Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d
303, 308 (Fla. 1977) (denial for wrongful death of stillborn).
42. Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 637, 92 P.2d 678, 683-84 (1939),
cited with approval in Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 570, 565 P.2d 122, 126, 139
Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1977); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56, 62-63 (N.D. Iowa 1960)
(predicting Iowa decision based on modern trend); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md.
417, 440, 79 A.2d 550, 561 (1950); Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 1233, 258 S.W.2d
577, 581 (1953); Weaks v. Mounter, 88 Nev. 118, 121-22, 493 P.2d 1307, 1309 (1972)
(dicta); Stetson v. Easterling, 274 N.C. 152, 156, 161 S.E.2d 531, 534 (1968); Williams
v. Marion Rapid Transit Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 128-29, 87 N.E.2d 334, 340 (1949);
Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924, 927 (Okla. 1976); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Or. 690, 697,
291 P.2d 225, 228 (1955); Seattle-First Nat. Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 289, 291, 367
states have recognized a wrongful death recovery for the death of a
viable fetus, with all courts recognizing that in order to maintain the
wrongful death action, the fetus must have been able to maintain an
action for personal injuries if it had lived.43 Massachusetts and
Michigan have extended wrongful death recovery to the pre-viable
fetus." It can be assumed that all of these states will allow a child
born alive to maintain such an action.
Ten states have not been confronted with the issue either in the
context of wrongful death or a cause of action asserted by a living
child.45 Thus, thirty-seven states recognize explicitly or by implica-
tion the right of recovery for prenatal injuries from at least the point
of viability and ten states are noncommittal. It could be safely as-
sumed that when these ten states are confronted with the issue, the
majority of them will at least allow recovery from the point of viabil-
ity if not from conception, because no court has explicitly rejected
the theory in modern times. In light of the majority of courts al-
lowing recovery for prenatal injuries sustained by a child born alive,
this analysis must turn to the present status of the doctrine of paren-
tal immunity in prohibiting lawsuits by children against their
parents.
P.2d 835, 838 (1962); see also White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 534, 458 P.2d 617, 621
(1969) (allowed wrongful death of viable fetus); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 357,
102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 485-86, 248 N.E. 2d
901, 905, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 70-71 (1969) (denied wrongful death action for stillborn
fetus). But cf. Kelly v. Gregory, 282 A.D. 542, 545, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 698 (1953)
(allowed recovery from the time of conception).
43. Worgan v. Greggo and Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 260, 128 A.2d 557, 558
(1956); Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 497-98, 277 N.E.2d 20, 21 (1971); Hale v.
Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 145-47, 368 P.2d 1, 3 (1962); Orange v. State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Ky. 1969); Danos v. St. Pierre, 383 So. 2d 1019, 1021
(La. App. 1980); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 371, 38 N.W.2d 838, 841
(1949); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 283, 72 So. 2d 434, 439-40 (1954); Salazar v.
St. Vincent Hosp., 95 N.M. 150, 155, 619 P.2d 826, 828-29 (1980); Fowler v. Wood-
ward, 244 S.C. 608, 612-13, 138 S.E.2d 42, 43-44 (1964); Shousha v. Matthews Drivur-
self Serv. Inc., 210 Tenn. 384, 396, 358 S.W.2d 471, 476 (1962); Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand
and Gravel Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Tex. 1967); Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075,
1077 (Utah 1975); Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp. of Vt., 139 Vt. 138, 141, 425
A.2d 92, 95 (1980); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 437, 184 S.E.2d 428, 434
(1971); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 22, 148 N.W.2d
107, 111 (1967); see also Rice v. Rizk, 453 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Ky. 1970); Pehrson v.
Kistner, 301 Minn. 299, 302, 222 N.W.2d 334, 336 (1974); Occhipinti v. Rheem Mfg.
Co., 252 Miss. 172, 177, 172 So. 2d 186, 189 (1965). But see Puihl v. Milwaukee Auto.
Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 356-57, 99 N.W.2d 163, 169-71 (1960) (condemned the viabil-
ity rule).
44. Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 448-49, 225 N.E.2d 926,
927 (1977); Womack v. Buckhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 725, 187 N.E.2d 218, 222 (1971).
45. South Dakota, North Dakota, Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Colorado, Arkansas,
Montana, Maine, and Wyoming.
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PARENTAL IMMUNITY
Overview of the Doctrine of Parental Immunity46
The doctrine of parental immunity in tort is a relatively new the-
ory in the history of American common law. Prior to its recognition
in 1884, there were no reported English or American cases which
barred a cause of action against a parent by a child arising out of
tortious actions, or contract or property matters.48 The recognition of
parental immunity in tort in the United States is credited by legal
scholars and the courts to three cases now labeled the "great
trilogy." 49
46. The following issues are relevant to a full discussion of the doctrine of parental
immunity, but are beyond the scope of this article: (1) parental liability to an unemanci-
pated child for the intentional infliction of injury; (2) parental liability to an emancipated
child for negligent or intentional injury; (3) liability of one standing in loco parentis to a
child for injuries sustained by negligent or intentional acts; (4) parental liability to a
child who is injured while an unemancipated minor, but who commences the lawsuit
when emancipated; and (5) the liability of a child to a parent for the negligent or inten-
tional infliction of injury to another child.
47. The doctrine of parental immunity is simply that a child cannot sue his parent
and a parent cannot sue his child in tort for personal injuries sustained arising out of a
negligent or intentional act. See W. PROSSER, supra note 24, § 122, at 865. This does not
mean a parent has no duty to prevent or avoid injuring his child, but that the immunity
arises to prevent the parent from being held legally liable to the child for compensatory
damages. See generally Owens v. Auto Mut. Indem. Co., 235 Ala. 9, 12, 177 So. 133,
136 (1937); Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 787 (Iowa 1981); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84
N.H. 352, 372, 150 A. 905, 915 (1930). Based upon public policy reasons, the courts
merely refuse to recognize the cause of action and the child is barred from suing. The
major reasons offered to justify the theory were that domestic tranquility and parental
discipline and control would be disrupted by allowing the cause of action. The only logi-
cal conclusion to be drawn from these justifications is that an uncompensated tort will
supposedly maintain peace in the family and respect for the parent even though the act
complained of is rape, a brutal beating, or very serious and disabling injuries. W. PROS-
SER, supra, note 24, § 122 at 866. This article will restrict its discussion to the analysis of
parental immunity dealing with parental liability to an unemancipated natural child who
has been injured by the negligent act of one or both of his parents.
48. Comment, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family - Husband & Wife -
Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152, 182 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Tort
Actions]; Note, Intrafamilial Tort Immunity in New Jersey: Dismantling the Barrier to
Personal Injury Litigation, 10 RUT.-CAM. L. REV. 661, 670 (1979). Prior to the trilogy,
discussed infra note 49, there were a few decisions addressing the issue of liability of one
standing in loco parentis to a child, but these cases were literally ignored in subsequent
decisions. Comment, Child v. Parent: Erosion of the Immunity Rule, 19 HASTINGS L.J.
201, 202 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Erosion].
49. The first case in the trilogy was Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885
(1891). The lawsuit concerned a claim of a minor daughter for personal injuries sus-
tained due to the actions of her mother. Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887. The Mississippi Su-
preme Court, without citing to any prior case law or statutory authority, created the
foundation for the parental immunity doctrine. The court noted the facts were unclear as
to whether the minor child was emancipated or not and if she was in fact living with her
After the trilogy, there was a methodical progression of lawsuits
which appeared before the various state courts. Their decisions rec-
ognized and upheld the doctrine of parental immunity.50 From that
point in time, commentators have documented its decline and char-
acterized it as illustrating the "orthodox process of judicial legisla-
tion by exception, elaboration and interpretation."5 "
In recognizing and upholding the doctrine of parental immunity,
and to justify the exceptions, the fifty state court jurisdictions devel-
mother in a traditional parent-child relationship. The minor child was married at the
time of the incident, but she was separated from her husband. Id. However, Justice
Woods, writing for the court, recognized that in the traditional parent-child relationship
where the parent has responsibility for the child and the child has a reciprocal duty to
obey, a civil action for injury to the minor child could not be recognized. Public policy
forbids such an action to preserve the family and the harmony of society. A child's only
course of redress was the criminal law which protected her from parental violence and
wrongdoing. Id.
The Tennessee Supreme Court followed Mississippi twelve years later in McKelvey v.
McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903). The court agreed with Hewellette that a
child's sole remedy was to resort to the criminal laws for punishing the parent's gross
misconduct. Within the parent-child relationship, a parent has a duty to maintain, pro-
tect, and educate the child with the corresponding right to custody and control. The right
included the ability to sustain and inflict moderate chastisement upon the child. Again,
without citing to prior authority beyond Hewellette, the court upheld what it called the
"well settled rule controlling the relation of father and child." Id. at 393, 77 S.W. at
665.
Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905), completed the trilogy with probably
the most repulsive factual situation of any parental immunity case. A daughter was suing
for personal injuries sustained as a result of being raped by her father. In apparent igno-
rance of the McKelvey decision, the Washington Supreme Court followed Hewellette and
developed further reasoning to "uphold" the parental immunity doctrine. In denying the
child's right to recovery, the court recognized the interests society has in preserving har-
mony in domestic relations. It rejected the plaintiff's assertion that there could be no
harmony to protect in a family where a father had committed a heinous crime of rape
upon his own daughter. Id. The court was also concerned that if the child recovered and
subsequently died, the very parent sued might recover the monies. It was also concerned
that suits of this kind threatened the family resources and endangered the financial wel-
fare of other minor members of the family. Id. at 245, 79 P. at 789.
Despite the seemingly barbaric result in Roller, the court foresaw the type of issues
which are being addressed in this paper. It appears the court was willing to deny recov-
ery to an obviously worthy claim because it did not know where it could draw the line in
future child-parent cases. It could not see what "type" of claim it could allow and still
hold to the strong public policy of preserving the family unit. This inability to develop a
workable definition of the duty of a parent to a child reappeared in virtually every immu-
nity case which followed the trilogy. This finally led the courts to take the step of recog-
nizing specific exceptions to the general rule of nonliability and avoid the issue of defin-
ing a parent's general duty to a child.
50. Comment, Tort Actions, supra note 48, at 182.
51. Id. at 217. Some of the most common exceptions allowing recovery were when
(I) the child and parents were deceased when the lawsuit was commenced; (2) the par-
ents were deceased when the lawsuit was commenced; (3) the parent was engaged in
vocational or business activity at the time of the injury; (4) the parent intentionally in-jured the child; and (5) the parent had relinquished custody or abdicated his'parental
responsibility.
For a complete review of the development and/or demise of the parental immunity
doctrine, see Annot., 6 A.L.R. 4th 1066 (1981).
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oped somewhat of a consensus that the following reasons justified
maintaining it as a viable doctrine: 2
(1) Society's concern for the preservation of the family unit;53
(2) Society's concern for the preservation of parental authority;54
(3) The injured child already has a remedy in criminal proceed-
ings or in removal from his parent's custody;55
(4) The preservation of the family exchequer; 56
(5) The suggested analogy between the relationship of husband
and wife immunity;57
(6) The possibility that the parent could inherit any judgment
the child might recover;58
(7) The possibility that frivolous claims might flood the courts;59
(8) The danger of fraud and collusion between the parties in
cases involving insurance.60
For approximately the next thirty years, the courts continued to
accept the rationale and uphold the doctrine while creating exception
after exception. 1 Finally in 1963, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
took the first major step which reversed the trend. Wisconsin started
the assault by recognizing a general duty of a parent to a child and
abolishing the general rule of nonliability in the landmark case of
Goller v. White.62
In Goller, Wisconsin abolished the doctrine leaving two "immu-
nity exceptions" which still protected the parents.6 " Since Goller,
fourteen states have abrogated parental immunity either totally or
with certain limited immunity exceptions.6" Ten states have abol-
ished the doctrine while restricting their holding to the specific case
before them indicating that they will proceed on a case-by-case ba-
52. See Defining the Parent's Duty After Rejection of Parent-Child Immunity:
Parental Liability for Emotional Injury to Abandoned Children, 33 VAND. L. REV. 775,
777-78, 794 (1980).
53. E.g., Bahr v. Bahr, 478 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Mo. 1972).
54. E.g., Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 716, 156 N.W.2d 105, 107 (1968).
55. E.g., Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 205, 610 P.2d 560, 564 (1980).
56. E.g., Orefice v. Albert, 237 So. 2d 142, 145 (Fla. 1970).
57. E.g., Downs v. Poulin, 216 A.2d 29, 32 (Me. 1966).
58. E.g., Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 761, 611 P.2d 135, 137 (1980).
59. See, e.g., Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
60. E.g., Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 251, 163 A.2d 147, 150 (1960).
61. The majority of courts have systematically relied upon three of the justifica-
tions listed above: (1) to preserve the family harmony unit, (2) to preserve parental au-
thority, and (3) to prevent fraud and collusion. Comment, Parental Immunity: The Case
for Abrogation of Parental Immunity in Florida, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 794, 798 (1973).
62. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
63. Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
64. See infra notes 142, 186, 191 and accompanying text.
sis.e5 Seven states have abolished the doctrine at least in the area of
automobile liability. 6 Twelve states remain loyal to the doctrine,67
65. See infra notes 122, 126 and accompanying text.
66. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
67. The states that continue to uphold immunity as an absolute bar are clearly in
the minority. However, ten of them continue to maintain the doctrine as an absolute bar
in parent-child actions arising out of a negligent act. Owens v. Auto Mut. Indem. Co.,
235 Ala. 9, 12, 177 So. 133, 136 (1937); Thomas v. Inmon, 268 Ark. 221, 223, 594
S.W.2d 853, 854 (1980); Vaughan v. Vaughan, 161 Ind. App. 497, 500, 316 N.E.2d 455,
457 (1974); Louisiana by Statute: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:571 (West 1965). See also
Bondurant v. Bondurant, 386 So. 2d 705, 706 (La. Ct. App. 1980); Hewellette v. George,
68 Miss. 703, 711, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891), cited with approval in MeNeal v. Adm.'r of
Estate of McNeal, 254 So. 2d 521, 523 (Miss. 1971); Teramano v. Teramano, 6 Ohio St.
2d 117, 119, 216 N.E.2d 375, 377 (1966); Workman v. Workman, 498 P.2d 1384, 1386-
87 (Okla. 1972); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 134, 131 A. 198, 199-200 (1925),
cited with approval in Castellucci v. Castellucci, 96 R.I. 34, 37, 188 A.2d 467, 468
(1963); Campbell v. Gruttemeyer, 222 Tenn. 133, 140, 432 S.W.2d 894, 900 (1968);
Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 56-57, 269 P.2d 302, 314 (1954).
The major justification for retention of the doctrine is to prevent family deterioration
or to promote family harmony which in turn is beneficial to the public at large. See Ball
v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 56-57, 269 P.2d 302, 314 (1954); Campbell v. Gruttemeyer, 222
Tenn. 133, 139, 432 S.W.2d 894, 899 (1968); Vaughan v. Vaughan, 166 Ind. App. 491,
500, 316 N.E.2d 455, 457 (1974); Workman v. Workman, 498 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Okla.
1972); McNeal v. Adm.'r of Estate of McNeal, 254 So. 2d 521, 523 (Miss. 1971);
Owens v. Auto Mut. Indem. Co., 235 Ala. 9, 10, 177 So. 133, 134 (1937). The Arkansas
Supreme Court as recently as 1980 explicitly held the doctrine is not a legal anachronism
and that to allow a child to sue his parent is "repugnant to natural sentiments concerning
family relations." Thomas v. Inmon, 268 Ark. 221, 223, 594 S.W.2d 853, 854 (1980)
(quoting Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 834, 114 S.W.2d 468, 469 (1938)).
Another major concern is the likelihood of fraud and collusion when an intrafamily
suit is allowed. Id. This is of particular concern when insurance is available to satisfy the
judgment. These two concerns are theoretically inconsistent. The decisions hold this type
of suit severely disrupts the family, but there is an equal belief that it in fact brings the
family together in order to profit from the negligent wrong of the parent. This may be
considered twisted reasoning, yet it may confirm the view of dissenting Justice May of
Arkansas that the doctrine is no longer needed. The only time an action would be main-
tained is when the real party in interest is the insurance company. Id. at 224, 594
S.W.2d at 855 (Mays, J. dissenting).
Justice Mays' thesis was that tort suits are not commenced unless there is a deep
pocket from which the child can recover. Therefore, discussions of family harmony are
irrelevant; whatever disruption there is was caused by the injury itself. The suit is merely
an attempt to compensate the child and/or family to provide financial assistance for the
necessary care and treatment.
Two jurisdictions have not clearly been confronted with the issue of parental immu-
nity. In the only case in South Dakota, the court upheld the doctrine. It applied Minne-
sota law which was binding on the particular litigation. Kloppenburg v. Kloppenburg, 66
S.D. 167, 167, 280 N.W. 206, 206 (1938). The decision lacks any discussion of whether
applying Minnesota law was contrary or repugnant to the public policy of South Dakota.
An admittedly debatable conclusion can be drawn that the court would recognize the
doctrine, yet the 1938 decision may provide no hint since Minnesota has since rejected
the doctrine. Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980).
Despite the lack of prior authority, it can be inferred that Utah would recognize and
uphold the doctrine. In Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963),
the Utah court upheld interspousal immunity by relying on foreign decisions which up-
held the parental immunity doctrine. Id. at 347, 384 P.2d at 393. As recently as 1978,
the court cited Rubalcava with approval indicating its primary concern there was with
the protection of family harmony. Hull v. Silver, 577 P.2d 103, 103 (Utah 1978).
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and six other jurisdictions clearly allow recovery if the tortious act
was willful or wanton.68
An in-depth analysis of the current status of parental immunity is
necessary in order to understand the availability of a cause of action
of a child against its mother.0 9 The majority of states have not com-
pletely abolished the doctrine, and serious questions arise whether
the case of a fetus injured by its mother falls into any number of the
"exceptions" which continue to allow immunity. Therefore, a specific
review of the parental immunity decisions will be made followed by
an analysis of the probability of those jurisdictions entertaining a
cause of action by a child against its mother for negligently inflicted
prenatal injuries.
Specific Analysis of Parental Immunity and Prenatal Recovery
This analysis will traverse the maze of common law decisions
which have restricted the doctrine, and it will conclude with those
states that have totally abrogated parental immunity. Each section
will also compare the states' position on the recognition of prenatal
recovery and demonstrate the likelihood that child versus mother lia-
bility will be recognized. This analysis is painstakingly thorough in
order to demonstrate that the fifty state jurisdictions have not
reached a consensus on parental liability, but rather have reached
varied results along a wide spectrum.
Immunity Abolished for Automobile Accidents Only
Over the years, courts have found certain exceptions to the paren-
tal immunity doctrine. 0 In allowing recovery for negligent acts,
courts have not addressed the general issue of whether the parent
has a general duty to his unemancipated child. Instead, the decisions
framed the issue as whether there should be an exception based on
68. The remaining six jurisdictions have unquestionably denied recovery for the
negligent acts of a parent toward a child, but clearly refuse to uphold such a bar when
the parental act is willful and wanton. Horton v. Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 156, 526 P.2d
304, 308 (1974); Coleman v. Coleman, 156 Ga. App. 533, 534, 278 S.E.2d 114, 114
(1981). See also Maddox v. Queen, 150 Ga. App. 408, 410, 257 S.E.2d 918, 919-20
(1979), MacGrath v. Hoffman, 156 Ga. App. 240, 244, 274 S.E.2d 631, 633 (1980);
Mhanke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 69-70, 77 A.2d 923, 926 (1951); Sanford v. Sanford, 15
Md. App. 390, 395, 290 A.2d 812, 816 (1972); Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 215, 99
N.W.2d 16, 25 (1959); Chaffin v. Chaffin, 239 Or. 374, 381, 397 P.2d 771, 774 (1964);
Oldman v. Bartshe, 480 P.2d 99, 100-01 (Wyo. 1971).
69. The 18 states that have remained loyal to the doctrine will not be considered.
See supra notes 67-68.
70. See supra note 51.
the fact that the family unit or family harmony was irrelevant or not
in need of protection.7 1 The exceptions have been justified from the
broadly stated rule that there is no need for parental immunity for
acts of parents which do not arise out of the parental relationship,
nor when the parent has temporarily abandoned his parental role. 2
Seven jurisdictions have chosen to find an additional exception for
the ordinary use of an automobile. 3 In the states that have allowed
this new exception by case decision, there is a clear division of au-
thority as to why the suits should be allowed.74
Schenk v. Schenk, 7 5 an often cited Illinois Appellate Court opin-
ion, allowed the cause of action based on the premise that injuries
related to an automobile accident do not fall within the parent-child
relationship. A father sued his daughter for injuries sustained while
he was crossing a street.7' The court held that at the time of the
accident, both father and daughter were exercising their rights with
their corresponding duties of care on the public streets and with no
direct connection with the family relationship. It held this was con-
duct outside of the family relationship and not directly connected
with the family purposes and objectives. Under these facts the court
was not attempting to supervise everyday family conduct, but was
simply recognizing the rights of the public at large.7
This decision could be interpreted as recognizing a new exception
to the immunity doctrine likened to the situations of employer-em-
ployee cases or intentional torts. However, implicit in the decision is
a total rejection of the family harmony argument that suits allowed
between a parent and an unemancipated child are disruptive to the
family unit. In fact, the Illinois Appellate Court rejected this inter-
71. See supra note 61.
72. Comment, Erosion, supra note 48, at 206.
73. Two states allow recovery by statute: Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-
572c (West Supp. 1983-1984), North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1983). See
also Ooms v. Ooms, 164 Conn. 48, 51, 316 A.2d 783, 785 (1972); Snow v. Nixon, 52
N.C. App. 131, 135, 277 S.E.2d 850, 852-53 (1981). Five states allow recovery by com-
mon law decision. Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669, 673 (Del. 1976); Ard v. Ard, 414
So. 2d 1066, 1070 (Fla. 1982); Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Il1. App. 2d 199, 206, 241 N.E.2d
12, 15 (1968); Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 186, 183 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1971); Lee v.
Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 725 (W. Va. 1976).
74. The use of the automobile in the United States is an everyday occurrence for
most Americans. Obviously, it is an integral activity of the family as transportation for
vacation, schools, extracurricular activities, shopping for family needs, etc. Plaintiffs' at-
torneys throughout the nation came to question whether the use of the automobile by a
parent was necessarily an act arising out of the parent-child relationship. In addition, due
to the intense state involvement in the licensing of automobiles, automobile insurance has
become mandatory in many states. Insurance has become pervasive through mandatory
or voluntary compliance with obtaining minimum limits of liability coverage. See Com-
ment, supra note 61, at 798.
75. 100 Il1. App. 2d 199, 206, 241 N.E.2d 12, 15 (1968).
76. Id. at 200, 241 N.E.2d at 12.
77. Id. at 205-06, 241 N.E.2d at 15.
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pretation of "family harmony" stating it was more narrowly drawn.
The protection of "family harmony" was limited to suits inviting
endless litigation over what is or is not ordinary negligence in the
operation of the household.78 The allowance of the suit itself was
not the type of disruption parental immunity desired to protect, but
the litigation of the issue of what was negligent conduct within the
parent-child relationship.
The Delaware Supreme Court impliedly adopted this reasoning in
attempting to explain a prior decision allowing a child versus parent
lawsuit arising out of an automobile accident. In Williams v. Wil-
liams,79 the Delaware court had allowed such an action apparently
on the sole ground that the presence of insurance vitiated all thejustifications for parental immunity. 0 However, in Schneider v.
Coe,8 when confronted with a case of negligent parental supervision,
the court explained the Williams decision by stating that driving an
automobile was not unique to the parent-child relationship and does
not bring into question the validity of state supervision of parental
control, authority and discretion of raising a child.8 2
The Williams-Schneider rationale seemingly goes one step further
than the Illinois Appellate Court in Schenk because the plaintiffs in
Williams were out of state at the time of the accident, presumably
on a family trip or vacation of some kind.83 A literal reading of
Schenk would appear to allow recovery only if the act of driving the
automobile did not go to the fulfillment of family purposes or objec-
tives. In fact, the Illinois Appellate Court has held immunity applies
when the injuries occurred where the automobile was being used to
transport the mother and son to a college the son was considering
attending in the following year.8 The importance of the reasoning is
that the courts narrowed the concept of family harmony by holding
the lawsuit itself was not disruptive.
The majority of courts abolishing parental immunity for automo-
bile accident injuries have relied upon the prevalence of insurance
coverage. Virginia's highest court stated that the availability of in-
surance caused the doctrine to become a legal anachronism.85 West
78. Id.
79. 369 A.2d 669 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976).
80. Id. at 673.
81. Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979).
82. Id. at 684.
83. 369 A.2d at 669-70.
84. Eisele v. Tenuta, 83 Iii. App. 3d 799, 802, 404 N.E.2d 349, 350 (1980).
85. Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 185, 183 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1971).
Virginia and Florida courts succinctly stated the reasoning for all
the courts by noting that where insurance exists, a suit by a child for
injuries sustained will be beneficial to the family relationship rather
than detrimental. 6 As the Delaware court had blatantly acknowl-
edged in Williams, this type of suit was not a truly adversarial situa-
tion, but rather a situation where both parties are seeking to recover
from the insurance carrier to provide for the child so as not to de-
plete the family assets.17
This approach to abrogating parental immunity has been severely
criticized as being legally weak and untidy.88 It is argued that the
major weakness in this approach is that such language could be pre-
cedent for a radical change in tort law for deciding liability. The
mere presence of insurance without additional justification has never
before been the basis for recognizing a cause of action.89 However,
these decisions can be interpreted as eliminating the justification for
parental immunity due to the fact that the insurance coverage pro-
tects the family assets and allegedly increases family harmony by
compensating the injured child. As will be demonstrated infra,90 the
courts acknowledge that the mere abrogation of parental immunity
does not recognize a legal duty between parent and child.9 1 These
decisions also demonstrate the modern trend that any threat of fraud
or collusion has been rejected as a basis to deny recognition of a
cause of action. A mere opportunity for such conduct should not in
itself prevent an honest and meritorious claim.92
The criticism of this line of cases does have some merit when
viewing a subsequent decision of the Virginia Supreme Court. In
Wright v. Wright,9 3 the court was presented with a negligent super-
vision case where it upheld the parental immunity doctrine without
addressing the issue of whether the availability of insurance should
be controlling. There may be a valid argument that homeowners
insurance coverage is not as prevalent as automobile liability insur-
ance, but there is enough concern for the leaders of the insurance
industry to advocate a household members exclusion to eliminate
coverage for this type of negligent act.95 The courts could avoid the
86. Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 724 (W. Va. 1976); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d
1066, 1069 (Fla. 1982).
87. 369 A.2d at 672.
88. Thuillez, Parental Nonsupervisionr The Tort That Never Was, 40 ALB. L.
REV. 336, 349 (1976).
89. Id. at 349.
90. See infra text accompanying note 194.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 200-206.
92. See, e.g., Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721, 725 (W. Va. 1976).
93. 213 Va. 177, 191 S.E.2d 223 (1972).
94. Id. at 179, 191 S.E.2d at 225.
95. Casey, The Trend of Interspousal and Parental Immunity - Cakewalk Liabil-
ity, 45 INs. COUNS. J. 321, 331-34 (1978).
340
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potential inconsistency demonstrated by the Virginia court by clari-
fying their decisions as the Delaware court did in stating that the
function of driving an automobile is simply not the type of act that
falls under the rubric of the family relationship. The duty is ordina-
rily owed apart from the family relation.96
Of the states which have abrogated parental immunity in automo-
bile cases, three allow recovery for prenatal injuries sustained after
viability 97 and three from the time of conception.98 It would appear
that in these jurisdictions, if a woman negligently injures the fetus
while driving an automobile, she will be liable to her child for any
injuries or deformities resulting from those acts. But, as demon-
strated above, the underlying reasoning of the courts in recognizing a
cause of action may limit the duty owed by the mother to the fetus.99
In two states which have abolished immunity by statute, the scope
of the liability is defined as those acts arising out of the operation of
a motor vehicle.100 Therefore, a woman could be held liable to her
fetus not only for injuries due to her negligent driving, but also in
situations such as riding with a driver known to her to be intoxi-
cated, and even possibly for acts revolving around alighting from or
getting into an automobile. 01
The Illinois and Delaware courts must determine if the injury to a
fetus as a result of the woman's use of an automobile arises out of
the parental relationship. °2 The issue does not seem to be any differ-
ent for a fetus in the womb than for a child who is riding in the
car. 03 However, it could be construed that the entire time a woman
carries a fetus, she is fulfilling a family purpose or objective. This
96. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
97. Worgan v. Greggo and Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 260, 128 A.2d 557, 558
(1956); Stetson v. Easterling, 274 N.C. 152, 157, 161 S.E.2d 531, 534 (1968); Baldwin
v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 437, 184 S.E.2d 428, 434 (1971).
98. Simon v. Mullin, 34 Conn. Supp. 139, 147, 380 A.2d 1353, 1357 (1977); Day
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). But see
Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303, 308 (Fla. 1977) (denial of wrongful death of stillborn);
Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 357, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (1977).
99. See supra notes 70-96 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 73.
101. The Connecticut and North Carolina courts have seemingly come to two com-
pletely opposite views, based on interpretation of their particular statutes, as to what acts
are included within the definition of "arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle."
See Ooms v. Ooms, 164 Conn. 48, 316 A.2d 783 (1972) (upholding immunity for a
mother who allowed her three year old child to leave the car and cross a highway where
he was injured). Compare Snow v. Nixon, 52 N.C. App. 131, 277 S.E.2d 850 (1981)
(holding statute allowed recovery in situation similar to that in Ooms).
102. See supra notes 75-84.
103. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
analysis would seemingly fail; it ignores the courts' main concern
with protecting family harmony from litigation. This concern deter-
mines what is ordinary negligence in the operation of a household.0
The remaining jurisdictions that allow recovery when there is lia-
bility insurance should allow recovery for prenatal injuries.0 5 The
same policy considerations are present. Recovery now allowed for in-
juries sustained while the child is in a fetal state should not be sig-
nificant. What is implied but never recognized in these prior deci-
sions is that there is in fact an existing duty between parent and
child. These courts did not acknowledge the need to address this is-
sue, on the basis that the duty is the same one that has already been
recognized for third parties. However, as will be demonstrated, many
jurisdictions view the abolition of immunity and the recognition of a
duty as two separate issues. As long as these jurisdictions limit their
scope of inquiry to automobile accidents, they will not be forced to
address the issue of just what the scope of parental duty is.
Abrogation of Immunity on a Case-by-Case Basis
Nine jurisdictions abrogated immunity to a greater degree when
faced with lawsuits similar to those discussed above involving auto-
mobile accidents. 0 8 With a majority of these decisions less than ten
years old, the courts acknowledge that the modern trend and proper
approach in light of modern conditions and conceptions of public
policy dictate a relaxation if not abolition of the parental immunity
doctrine.10 7 The near unanimity in reasoning is striking as is the
unanimous agreement to retain a certain aspect of the immunity of
parents. These decisions show that the growing trend is to abolish
the crude, blanket immunity with far greater concern given to just
what acts, if any, the courts want to protect from state scrutiny.
The general theme of the decisions is a continuing concern for the
preservation of the family unit. All courts were willing to abolish
blanket immunity, but reserved the right in future cases to "protect"
the parents in the exercise of "parental authority and discretion," °8
or "parental discipline, care and control,"' 09 or "parental control and
104. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 85-87.
106. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz.
86, 89, 471 P.2d 282, 285 (1970); Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 205, 610 P.2d 560,
564 (1980); Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 787-88 (Iowa 1981); Nocktonick v.
Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 767, 611 P.2d 135, 148 (1980); Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d
634, 639-40 (Me. 1979); Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 365-66, 339 N.E.2d 907,
916 (1975); Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663, 669 (Mo. 1979); Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93
Wash. 2d 411, 416, 610 P.2d 891, 893 (1980).
107. E.g., Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 359, 339 N.E.2d 907, 912 (1975).
108. Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 788-90 (Iowa 1981); Nocktonick v.
Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 770, 611 P.2d 135, 142 (1980).
109. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 14 (Alaska 1967).
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discipline," 110 or parental supervision. 1
The exact meaning of these categories of parental behavior is un-
clear and will only be surmised in future decisions when the courts
are presented with concrete, factual situations. The essence appears
to center around the concept of family life which can include the
right to custody and the right to control and discipline the child
within the parental duty to support and properly care for the
child. 112 This refinement of the immunity doctrine tends to ratify the
holding of the Delaware court that the act complained of must go
specifically to parental authority and not the general classification of
the family relationship or objectives as enumerated by the Illinois
court.113
Consistent with the prior cases discussed, the presence of insur-
ance coverage had an indelible effect upon half of the state courts. 4
A similar, but more controlling factor was that the unemancipated
child was being denied a right to recover compensation merely be-
cause of its status, i.e., class discrimination. 1 5 In a further refine-
ment of the West Virginia and Florida courts' reasoning that the
allowance of the action would be beneficial rather than disharmoni-
ous to the family unit,136 a number of courts recognized that the
disruption is caused by the negligent act and subsequent injury, not
the lawsuit itself.11 7 The recovery by the child goes to repairing the
disruption that has occurred.
Arizona is the only state in this group of nine that denies recovery
110. Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663, 669 (Mo. 1979).
11I. Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 205, 610 P.2d 560, 564 (1980) (dicta). The
court in Pedigo upheld the immunity doctrine in a case of negligent parental supervision.
In defining the immunity, the court indicated the doctrine was not absolute and in the
uncharted area outside of parental supervision a child would not be denied redress for its
injuries.
112. Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663, 669 (Mo. 1979).
113. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
114. Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 88, 471 P.2d 282, 284 (1970); Hebel v.
Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska 1967); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 768, 611
P.2d 135, 141 (1980); Sorenson v. Sorenson, 639 Mass. 350, 362, 339 N.E.2d 907, 913-
14 (1975).
115. Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 88, 471 P.2d 282, 284 (1970); Turner v.
Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 787 (Iowa 1981); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758,
769, 611 P.2d 135, 140 (1980); Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska 1967); Black v.
Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 635 (Me. 1979); Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 359-60,
339 N.E.2d 907, 912 (1975).
116. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
117. Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 768, 611 P.2d 135, 141 (1980);
Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 360, 339 N.W.2d 907, 913-14 (1975).
for prenatal injuries to a child born alive. 118 If the above interpreta-
tion is correct, these jurisdictions would most likely allow a child to
sue its mother for prenatal injuries. They have acknowledged that
the injury itself is disruptive to the family unit, and that compensa-
tion will rebuild the harmony. The acts of a woman to her fetus do
not fall within the parameters of parental authority and the rearing
of a child. If they remain consistent with their policy justifications,
they have no choice but to recognize that this scenario justifies aboli-
tion of parental immunity. The remaining issues are whether these
jurisdictions will in fact recognize a duty on the part of the woman.
New York Approach
In 1961, Judge Fuld, dissenting in an opinion of the New York
Court of Appeals which upheld the parental immunity doctrine, suc-
cinctly expressed the view which would echo throughout future deci-
sions of other jurisdictions up to the present: "To tell them [the crip-
pled child and parents] that the pains must be endured for the peace
and welfare of the family is something of a mockery."11 9 At the
time, he saw that the doctrine was so riddled with exceptions that
the public policy reasons for its existence had lost their meaning. 120
Liability insurance was available to compensate the injured child
and it was ludicrous to deny a child a remedy when the parent com-
mitted a negligent act which had nothing to do with the family
relationship.. 2 '
Eight years later, in Gelbman v. Gelbman,122 the court of appeals
took heed of Judge Fuld's criticisms and totally abolished parental
immunity. The court acknowledged that the main argument of the
protection of family harmony was no longer viable to uphold the im-
munity doctrine. 23 Also, the threat of fraudulent or collusive suits
could be adequately dealt with by the judicial system, as this threat
had not prevented the courts from allowing a cause of action in other
118. Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 553-54, 529 P.2d 706, 707 (1975);
Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 561, 562 (N.D. Iowa 1960) (predicting Iowa decision based
on modern trend); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 147, 368 P.2d 1, 3 (1962); Keyes v.
Constr. Serv. Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 637, 165 N.E.2d 912, 915 (1960) (allowed from point
of viability for prenatal injuries if subsequently born alive). Cf. Torigian v. Watertown
News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 448-49, 225 N.E.2d 926, 927 (1977) (extended to previable
fetus in wrongful death action); Steggal v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 1233, 258 S.W.2d 557,
581 (1953); Seattle-First Nat. Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 289, 292, 367 P.2d 835, 838
(1962). Maine, Alaska and Idaho have not dealt with the issue. See supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
119. Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 482, 174 N.E.2d 718, 724, 215
N.Y.S.2d 35, 43 (1961) (Fuld, J. dissenting).
120. Id. at 476, 174 N.E.2d at 721, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 39.
121. Id. at 479, 174 N.E.2d at 723-24, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
122. 23 N.Y.2d 434, 437, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 530-31 (1969).
123. Id. at 438, 245 N.E.2d at 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
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areas of the law.124
In Gelbman, the court made an additional holding that would
prove to be particularly significant in later interpretations of parental
liability to children. It acknowledged what the states in the first two
classifications avoided-that it was not creating a new cause of ac-
tion or duty, but merely removing the barrier to recovery that for-
merly prohibited compensation after liability had been established.125
When faced with the issue of whether a parent could be held liable
for negligent supervision of his child, the court of appeals in
Holodook v. Spencer126 relied upon this lack of duty to refuse to
recognize the cause of action.
New York State required that a parent, according to his means,
provide his child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical atten-
tion, and education. Failure to meet these minimum standards would
result in criminal sanctions or loss of custody of one's child. Parents
were also required to provide proper guidance for and control over
their children. 127 When the court reviewed New York law beyond
these minimum duties and sanctions, it found it had never recog-
nized any other duties of a parent to a child that when breached
would allow a civil damage recovery.128 The law was silent regarding
allowing a cause of action by the child against the parent.
The court refused to give such recognition at that time. It saw the
danger of judicial determination of just what would constitute a
breach of this duty; it concluded that probably all injuries to chil-
dren could be avoided by closer supervision. Additionally, as a mat-
ter of public policy, it was unwilling to impose a reasonable person
standard or a code of conduct for the raising of children. It was the
court's belief that the obligations of a parent to a child derived their
strength from natural instinct, love, and morality, and not from min-
imum standards or negative compulsions set by law with correspond-
ing sanctions.12
The significance of the New York court's approach is that when it
comes to the care, nurturing, and supervision of the child by the par-
ent, the issue is now not one of immunity, but one of duty. In es-
sence, the court has held that criminal sanctions and child abuse and
neglect laws adequately protect the child while at the same time rec-
124. Id. at 438-39, 245 N.E.2d at 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
125. 23 N.Y.2d at 438-39, 245 N.E.2d at 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
126. 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974).
127. Id. at 44-45, 324 N.E.2d at 342, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 866-67.
128. Id. at 45, 324 N.E.2d at 343, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
129. Id. at 49-51, 324 N.E.2d at 345-46, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 870-71.
ognizing the legal tradition of minimum state interference in the
day-to-day raising of a family.130 The New York Court of Appeals
concluded that if in fact it is presented with a recognized duty ordi-
narily owed apart from the family relation, the law will not withhold
its sanctions merely because the parties are parent and child.131
The New York Court of Appeals has allowed recovery for prena-
tal injuries at least from the time of viability; 3 2 the latest lower
court decision, which has been the most recent decision in almost
twenty years, allows recovery from the time of conception.1 33 As in-
dicated, the New York courts have never recognized a duty on the
part of a woman to protect a fetus from injury during the gestation
period, and it is not clear that the courts would readily do so.
In the recent decision of Albala v. City of New York,134 the courts
refused to allow recovery for preconception negligence. Even though
the injuries were foreseeable, the court refused to recognize a duty
because it could not be defined in a reasonable and practical man-
ner.1 35 If conception occurs before the act causing the injury, the
fetus is an identifiable being within the zone of danger. In the case
of fetus versus mother, the actual tortfeasor is partially responsible
for the identifiable being's creation. Therefore, the minimal require-
ments of duty are present as required by New York law: identifiable
beings within the zone of danger and foreseeable risk.136 However,
the court requires more before recognizing a duty; it looks to con-
cerns of public policy and whether the court can apply the standard
uniformly.137
In Holodook, the court at least implies that the present criminal
and custodial laws are sufficient to protect the child from parental
negligence;3 8 beyond these minimum safeguards, New York courts
have not recognized a specific duty of the mother to her fetus.13 9
This argument is severely weakened by the fact the New York
courts have adopted the "well born" approach in prenatal injury
cases against third parties by recognizing the legal right of every
human being to begin life unimpaired by physical or mental defects
due to .the negligence of another.1 40 Therefore, the major concerns
130. Id. at 50-51, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 870-71.
131. Id. at 50-51, 324 N.E.2d at 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 871-72.
132. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 357-58, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951); see
also Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 485-88, 248 N.E.2d 901, 905, 301 N.Y.S.2d
65, 70-72 (1969) (denied a wrongful death action for stillborn fetus).
133. Kelly v. Gregory, 282 A.D. 542, 545, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 698 (1953).
134. 54 N.Y.2d 269, 429 N.E.2d 786, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981).
135. Id. at 273-74, 429 N.E.2d at 788, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
136. Id. at 272, 429 N.E.2d at 787, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
137. Id. at 273-74, 429 N.E.2d at 788, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
138. See supra notes 127-130 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
140. Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 483, 248 N.E.2d 901, 903, 301
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expressed in Albala are not present here unless the duty cannot be
practically and uniformly applied. This will be explored in the next
section.
The Goller Approach
Wisconsin was the first jurisdiction to abolish immunity in Goller
v. White,141 but the court retained immunity protection in two areas
of the parent-child relationship. Four states followed the Goller deci-
sion,1 42 but the Minnesota Supreme Court recently rejected its ap-
proach and adopted a new standard developed by the California Su-
preme Court. 43 The Goller approach retained immunity in the
following two areas:
(1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental
authority over the child; and
(2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of.ordi-
nary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, cloth-
ing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care. 144
The experience of these states in interpreting the Goller exceptions
has resulted in inconsistent results and arbitrary distinctions.145 This
difficulty in interpretation was one of the main reasons the Minne-
N.Y.S.2d 65, 68-69 (1969).
141. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
142. Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky. 1971); Plumley v. Klein, 388
Mich. 1, 8, 199 N.W.2d 169, 172-73 (1972); Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 442,
161 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1968), overruled by Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601
(Minn. 1980); France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 505, 267 A.2d 490, 494
(1970). See also Gross v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 158 N.J. Super. 442, 445-46, 386 A.2d
442, 444 (App. Div. 1978); Carey v. Davison, 181 N.J. Super. 283, 287-88, 437 A.2d
338, 341 (Law Div. 1981); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971).
143. Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 598, 601 (Minn. 1980).
144. 20 Wis. 2d at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198. Kentucky has adopted the Goller
approach, but not the specific language of the exceptions, opting to add to the first excep-
tion the "reasonable exercise of parental authority" and generalizing exception two to
"provisions for the care and necessities of the child." Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921,
923 (Ky. 1971). The Texas court followed the Rigdon language. Felderhoff v. Felderhoff,
473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971). The court stated that the Rigdon language was sub-
stantially similar to the Goller and Silesky approaches. Id. at 931. The Silesky approach
added "reasonable" to the first exception, but retained the original language of the sec-
ond exception as stated in Goller. See Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 442, 161
N.W.2d 631, 638 (1968). New Jersey has apparently followed Goller by way of dicta.
France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 505, 267 A.2d 490, 494 (1970). See also
Carey v. Davison, 181 N.J. Super. 283, 287-88, 437 A.2d 338, 341 (Law Div. 1981).
Michigan followed Silesky, but amended the second exception to read as "reasonable"
instead of "ordinary" parental discretion. Plumley v. Klein, 383 Mich. 1, 8, 199 N.W. 2d
169, 172-73 (1972).
145. Note, supra note 48, at 677.
sota court ultimately rejected the doctrine. 46 The harshest criticism
of the doctrine as enunciated by legal scholars, 147 and the Califor-
nia1 48 and Minnesota 49 Supreme Courts is that it is seen as intolera-
ble that if a parent's actions are immune, he may act negligently
with total impunity. This criticism is in reality a public policy debate
of the merits of the immunity doctrine itself which has always al-
lowed the parent total freedom in his actions. The Wisconsin court
was not setting a standard of conduct by retaining immunity for cer-
tain actions. 150 It was this very intent of retaining immunity coupled
with the language used to define the exceptions that the Minnesota
court saw as the fatal flaw in the Goller approach.
Beyond the public policy debate of the continuing validity of the
parental immunity doctrine, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
the Goller approach was theoretically inconsistent. Even though the
intent of Goller was to retain the cloak of immunity for two areas of
parental conduct, in reality the courts had interpreted these "excep-
tions" as definitions of parental duties thereby imposing by implica-
tion a "reasonable parent" standard of conduct.1 51 Assuming the ex-
146. Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Minn. 1980).
147. Comment, The "Reasonable Parent" Standard: An Alternative to Parent-
Child Tort Immunity, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 795, 807 (1976).
148. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288,
292-93 (1971).
149. Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Minn. 1980).
150. 20 Wis. 2d at 412-13, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
151. The Minnesota court noted that when it adopted the Goller standards, it ad-
ded to the first exception the word "reasonable" in describing parental authority. Ander-
son v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Minn. 1980). See supra note 144 and accompany-
ing text. The court believed that a literal interpretation of an unreasonable parental act
was that the parent would not be immune. However, this construction would be coexten-
sive with the conclusion that the parent was negligent. Thus, the parent would only be
immune when he nonnegligently exercised his parental authority. This analysis would
completely contradict the meaning of immunity and would in reality be defining a duty
or standard of conduct. The court felt the same analysis could be drawn with the word
"ordinary" in the second exception. 295 N.W.2d at 598.
This argument may be particularly applicable to the Michigan approach which in-
serted "reasonable" into both exceptions. See supra note 144. Wisconsin could argue that
this is a misreading of their language or merely problems caused by Michigan's modify-
ing it. A review of Wisconsin's first exception shows it does not include just reasonable,
but all parental authority exercised by a parent. The second exception talks of ordinary
parental discretion. "Ordinary" is defined as: "regular; usual; normal; common; often
recurring; according to established order; settled; customary; ... ." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1249 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). It can be argued that "ordinary" describes the type of
act, for example, a parent ordinarily has the duty and discretion to decide if a child
needs a doctor when he is sick, but it may be unreasonable to wait five days when the
child has 105' fever.
Thus, a parent is immune from tort liability for negligently failing to provide necessary
medical care; this is ordinarily the responsibility of a parent in the day-to-day upbringing
of a child. At the same" time, even though the parent is immune from civil suit, the
parent may lose custody of the child if the child is determined to be dependent or ne-
glected under the state statute. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.13 (West 1979 & Supp. 1983-
1984). Based on this analysis, Wisconsin does not have the same problems as Minnesota
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ceptions to liability are just that, and not standards of conduct, there
remains further disagreement as to what type of parental conduct
falls within the exceptions.
The Wisconsin court has interpreted the first exception of "paren-
tal authority" as embracing the area of discipline.152 The second ex-
ception is limited to legal obligations of providing for the health,
morals, and well-being of the child. A failure to provide such neces-
sities will result in state intervention under child neglect and depen-
dency laws. It does not protect all acts arising out of the parent-child
relationship, but just those parental acts which the parent is legally
obligated to provide to a child. 153 Thus, the care a parent gives to a
child on a day-to-day basis is not covered by the exception. 5
The Texas, Kentucky, and Michigan Supreme Courts have not
had a chance to interpret these exceptions, but the Michigan Court
of Appeals has done so in two cases which directly contradict the
Wisconsin court's interpretation.155 The court interprets the first ex-
ception to include not only parental discipline, but the obligation to
supervise the child's behavior. It concluded that it would be impossi-
ble to distinguish between parental acts of authority and parental
acts of supervision. In order to supervise a child, there is some
and Michigan because the word "reasonable" is not used in the exceptions.
152. Thoreson v. Milwaukee, 56 Wis. 2d 231, 246, 201 N.W.2d 745, 753 (1972).
153. Cole v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629, 634, 177 N.W.2d 866, 868-69
(1970).
154. The application of this interpretation to specific cases results in immunity for
failure to instruct a child on how to safely alight from a bus and cross a highway, Le., for
failure to educate; but the day-to-day supervision of the child's physical activities are not
immune. Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75, 78-79, 158 N.W.2d 341, 343 (1968). Liabil-
ity without immunity will lie for injuries to one's child when:
(1) allowed by a parent to ride on the sidebar of a tractor. Goller v. White, 20
Wis. 2d 402, 404, 122 N.W.2d 193, 193-94 (1963);
(2) failure to supervise a two-year-old playing on a swingset. Cole v. Sears Roe-
buck & Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629, 630, 177 N.W.2d 866, 868 (1970); and
(3) failure to supervise a two-year-old at home alone who later runs out of the
house and is struck by a car. Thoreson v. Milwaukee, 56 Wis. 2d 231, 233, 201
N.W.2d 745, 753 (1972). See also Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 261, 201
N.W.2d 825, 826 (1972) (child injured by lawnmower; held, parent was not
immune).
There is seemingly little difference between failure to instruct a child on crossing a
highway and teaching a child not to leave the house. It is the opinion of at least one
jurisdiction that Lemmen has been impliedly rejected in subsequent cases and that Wis-
consin is now consistently and narrowly interpreting the exception to exclude immunity
protection for all negligent supervision cases involving the day-to-day care of a child.
Carey v. Davison, 181 N.J. Super. 283, 288-89 n.1, 437 A.2d 338, 341 n.1 (Law Div.
1981).
155. Paige v. Bing Constr. Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 233 N.W.2d 46 (1975); Mc-
Callister v. Sun Valley Pools, Inc., 100 Mich. App. 131, 298 N.W.2d 687 (1980).
amount of discipline involved.15
Working under the same theory, the Wisconsin and Michigan
courts have dramatically different immunity doctrines in that Michi-
gan law protects the parents in almost all acts arising out of the
parent-child relationship and Wisconsin law severely restricts immu-
nity to discipline and failure to properly provide for the physical and
intellectual needs of the child. In substance, the Wisconsin court has
adopted the California and Minnesota Supreme Courts' "reasonable
parent"157 standard by implication. In all decisions of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court that refused to grant parents immunity, the court,
without citing authority, recognized a legal duty of the parents to
supervise a child in the day-to-day upbringing of the child. The sub-
sequent breach of that duty resulted in liability. 58 The Wisconsin
court has impliedly held that the duty of parental supervision in tort
was created by the abolition of parental immunity.1 59
The Goller approach was the first attempt to establish that paren-
tal immunity was the exception and liability would be the general
rule. The Wisconsin court has apparently been successful in severely
limiting the remaining immunity protections, yet the courts that
have attempted to improve upon the theory have succeeded in reach-
ing totally contradictory and confusing results. The failure of the
theory to provide consistent results is due to the inability of the
156. Paige v. Bing Constr. Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 485-86, 233 N.W.2d 46, 48-49
(1975); McCallister v. Sun Valley Pools, Inc., 100 Mich. App. 131, 139, 298 N.W.2d
687, 691 (1980).
157. See infra notes 212-229 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 152-154 and accompanying text.
159. This analysis was recently rejected by the New Jersey court which has also
adopted the Goller approach. France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 505, 267
A.2d 490, 494 (1970). But the court restricted its analysis to automobile accidents only.
The issue has not been presented to the court since that time, but the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, interpreted the holding to apply to all parent-child relationships and
that such exceptions are to be strictly construed. Gross v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 158
N.J. Super. 443, 447, 386 A.2d 442, 445 (App. Div. 1978). The Appellate Division was
consistent with Wisconsin in disallowing immunity when a father injured a child with a
lawnmower. Id. Hoivever, the most recent New Jersey decision by the Superior Court,
Law Division, confronted the issue from the Holodook "duty approach." Carey v.
Davison, 181 N.J. Super. 283, 290-91, 437 A.2d 338, 343 (Law Div. 1981). But see Fritz
v. Anderson, 148 N.J. Super. 68, 73-74, 371 A.2d 833, 834-35 (Law Div. 1977) (refused
to extend France beyond auto accident cases).
In Carey, the New Jersey Supreme Court found it has never recognized a legal duty
which will allow a parent to be liable to the child if breached. It did point out, however,
that there is a recognized legal duty to a child from one who has a special relationship
with the child that requires protecting the child from injury, for example, a school princi-
pal. 181 N.J. Super. at 292, 437 A.2d at 343. The court refused to recognize the legal
duty of the parent to the child, but held that one would state a cause of action which
would survive a motion to dismiss if it was alleged the father had a special relationship to
a daughter when he voluntarily attempts to guide her safely across a highway and alleg-
edly does so negligently. Id. at 292, 437 A.2d at 343-44. See also Convery v. Maczka,
163 N.J. Super. 411, 415-16, 394 A.2d 1250, 1252-54 (Law Div. 1978) (unclear if court
recognized a legal duty of a parent or the "special relationship" duty).
350 .
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courts to uniformly define what acts are still immune and what acts
are subject to liability.
All of these jurisdictions allow recovery for prenatal injuries
against third parties. Two states allow recovery for previable inju-
ries, 160 and the remaining three cut off liability at the time of viabil-
ity."6 As set forth above, the Goller approach retains two immunity
exceptions.16 2 This discussion of prenatal injury recovery of a child
will be limited to the second exception since the first deals with "pa-
rental authority" which none of the jurisdictions have interpreted to
mean the nourishment and medical care of the child. The language
of the first exception on its face precludes further discussion that it
would be applicable to a woman's negligent prenatal care of the
fetus.
It could be argued that if the woman injures the fetus due to the
ingestion of drugs, failing to provide proper nourishment, or placing
her body in a position to receive an injurious physical blow, such
actions fall under the second exception. The Wisconsin court has
held that this exception relates directly to the legal duties of parents
to provide and protect a child in order to maintain the child's physi-
cal and mental health as dictated by statutory requirements. Failure
to do so will result in the child being declared a dependent or ne-
glected child with the parents possibly losing custody to the state. 63
If one assumes the standards which apply to a child born alive also
apply to the unborn fetus, the mother's failure to properly provide
for the fetus would result in immunity from civil liability. If the
Wisconsin court agreed with this analysis, it would be similar to an
implied holding of the New York court that the neglect and depen-
dency custodial statutes are a sufficient way to protect a child; if not,
the child is removed from the custody of the natural parent.' 6 The
weakness of this argument is that even if the statutes applied to the
unborn child,'6 5 the probability of state authorities becoming aware
160. Womack v. Buckhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 725, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (1971);
Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 357, 367, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (1960).
161. Orange v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Ky. 1969);
Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand and Gravel Inc., 4199 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Tex. 1967); Kwaterski
v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 22, 148 N.W.2d 107, 111 (1967). But
see Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 356-57, 99 N.W.2d 163, 169-71
(1960) (for outright condemnation of the viability rule).
162. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 130-131 and accompanying text.
165. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.02(2) (West 1979) (defines child as a person who
is less that 18 years of age). See also supra note 151 and accompanying text.
of an endangered fetus would be remote and the likelihood is far
greater that the state will learn of the neglect after the child is born
and the child is already deformed.
The critics of the Goller approach find it intolerable that a third
party would be held liable for such acts, but not a parent.1 68 How-
ever, it has been advocated that the relationship between a woman
and her fetus is simply different from that between the fetus and
third parties.18  The Wisconsin court recognized this fact by ac-
knowledging the state's extraordinary power to define minimum
standards of conduct. When presented with the issue, it may deter-
mine that a civil remedy for the child is not warranted unless the
state legislature decides to act under its police power.
This analysis fails under the Michigan court's approach which re-
placed the word "ordinary" with "reasonable" in the second excep-
tion.1 8  In Grodin v. Grodin,1 69 the Michigan intermediate court
agreed with the above argument that the mother's ingestion of tetra-
cycline fell under the second exception relating to parental discretion
with respect to a child's needs. They held it was for the jury to deter-
mine if this was a "reasonable act" and if not, they would not be
prevented by the immunity exception from holding the mother
liable.170
This interpretation demonstrates the validity of the Minnesota Su-
preme Court's criticism that the exception to liability is not an ex-
ception at all, but rather a standard of conduct which if violated will
result in liability, i.e., if it determines that she is not immune, the
jury has in fact determined the mother was negligent.
The one assumption made under any of these arguments is that
the parent in fact has a legally recognized duty to the child in the
first instance. Even though the New Jersey court adopted the Goller
approach, the decision of its Superior Court injected the Holodook
analysis that rejection of parental immunity did not create new
causes of action.171 Even if the conduct does not fall within either
exception, there still must be a legal duty which has been breached
in order to allow the cause of action.
The analysis will be the same as the New York court's, that the
neglect and dependency statutes will be construed as the only ade-
quate remedy; or it will be seen as recognizing a legal duty, the
breach of which will result in civil liability for compensatory dam-
ages. If it can be construed as a litmus test, the court in Grodin
166. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
167. Note, supra note 27, at 1259.
168. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
169. Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980).
170. Id. at 401, 301 N.W.2d at 871.
171. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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recognized, without citation to precedent, that a woman's duty to her
fetus to prevent injuries caused by her own negligence was the same
duty as that of a third person.1 2
Reasonable Parent Standard
In 1971 the California Supreme Court attempted to strike a bal-
ance between the Goller approach and total abrogation of parental
immunity. In the case of Gibson v. Gibson, s73 the court abolished
parental immunity and set forth a duty defined as the "reasonable
parent standard." The explicit standard is as follows: "what would
an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent have done in similar
circumstances?"1 74
The court, in attempting to resolve many of the problems which
have concerned other state courts, recognized the parent-child rela-
tionship is unique in some respects and one cannot blindly apply
traditional concepts of negligence. 7 5 However, it refused to accept
the notion that in certain or all areas of child rearing, a parent could
act in any manner and then hide behind the defense of parental im-
munity.176 Thus, the standard it accepted was the traditional one of
reasonableness, but viewed in light of the parental role. 77 The court
hoped to eliminate the arbitrary line drawing that constantly con-
fronts courts that have accepted the Goller approach17 8 of retaining
immunity under the ambiguous phrase of "parental authority and
discretion."
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently followed the California
Supreme Court in adopting this approach. 79 However, the majority
of jurisdictions have either rejected or ignored the "reasonable par-
ent" standard even though there has been overwhelming scholarly
172. 102 Mich. App. at 400-01, 301 N.W.2d at 870.
173. 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
174. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
175. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
176. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 652-53, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
177. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
178. Id. at 922, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293. See also notes 144-171 and
accompanying text.
179. See Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980). Minnesota Jus-
tice Rogosheske dissented and pointed out that Minnesota was the first state to do so
since California adopted the theory ten years before. Id. at 602 (Rogosheske, J. dissent-
ing). This argument is particularly compelling in that the majority of courts have either
reaffirmed the parental immunity doctrine in total, or partially or totally abolished the
doctrine, without adopting the Gibson approach. See infra note 196 and accompanying
text.
approval of it.18o The majority are unwilling to leave the parent sub-
ject to liability based on a general standard of conduct1 81 The desire
appears to be an adoption of a "go-slow" approach of dismantling
parental immunity on a case-by-case basis. These jurisdictions also
feel it is impossible for a jury to determine what standard to apply
due to the nation's diversity in religious, ethnic and cultural
backgrounds.182
Justice Rogosheske's dissent in Anderson v. Stream1 8 3 clearly
enunciated the major criticisms of the nation's jurists on why the
"reasonable parent" standard is unacceptable:
First, the objective standard encourages parents to disparage the favored
American principle of freedom of choice in family matters by holding out
the possibility of an insurance recovery if a parent is willing to expose his
conduct and judgment to public scrutiny. Second, jury verdicts based on a
reasonable parent standard in this value-laden area do not inspire public
confidence, since they would necessarily substitute parental judgments
based upon the individual juror's views of proper or ideal child-rearing
practices. The tendency toward arbitrary and intrusive standards of good
parenting, which stems from the fact that most jurors have strong views in
this area due to their personal experiences as parents and children, cannot
be alleviated by precise instructions. The reasonable parent standard thus
invites a recovery-oriented parent to gamble that a jury will find him negli-
gent. Moreover, since the jury must consider the family context and the
parent is the best, and perhaps only, witness capable of expressing the per-
sonal, cultural and socio-economic principles by which he raises his chil-
dren, the danger of collusion is significant. These are not the type of claims
our adversary system of factfinding is equipped to impartially resolve, and
the parent's incentive for an opportunity to influence the result is so great as
to further undermine the process.'"
The proponents of the standard believe its main value is its flex-
ibility. It relieves the court of the inflexible Goller approach in that a
parent no longer has the "right" to neglect or abuse his child. The
child is protected and yet the parent has latitude in raising the child
if his conduct is reasonable. However, even the proponents acknowl-
edge the validity of the argument that there is no acceptable judicial
scrutiny of a "reasonable parent." 18 5 Therefore, the argument as to
the effectiveness of the standard is in reality not a legal analysis, but
180. See, e.g., Comment, Parental Immunity: California's Answer, 8 IDAHo L.
REV. 179, 187 (1971); Note, The Parent-Child Tort Immunity Law in Massachusetts,
12 NEw ENGL. L. REV. 309, 331 (1976); Note, supra note 48, at 679; Comment, Par-
ent-Child Tort Immunity in Oklahoma: Some Consideration for Abandoning the Total
Immunity Shield, 12 TULSA L. J. 545, 553 (1977); Comment, supra note 147, at 808;
Comment, supra note 61, at 801.
181. E.g., Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411, 416, 610 P.2d 891, 893 (1980).
182. E.g., Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 205, 610 P.2d 560, 563 (1980). Min-
nesota summarily rejected this contention stating that the legal system places great faith
in juries and there is no compelling reason to distrust their effectiveness in the parent-
child context.
183. 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980).
184. Id. at 602.
185. Comment, supra note 147, at 809.
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a clashing of the Minnesota court majority's optimistic view of the
enlightened jury system and Justice Rogosheske's pessimistic opinion
of human nature.
California and Minnesota courts allow prenatal injury recovery as
against third persons at least from the point of viability."8 6 The two
states should readily accept a prenatal injury cause of action because
it fulfills the intent of the courts to allow a child a remedy for inju-
ries sustained by parental conduct.187 It would be assumed that the
standard should be what an ordinarily reasonable and prudent preg-
nant woman would have done in similar circumstances. 188
The merging of the doctrines of parental liability and prenatal in-
jury recovery may force the California and Minnesota courts to ex-
tend prenatal recovery at least to the time of conception. By cutting
off liability at the time of viability the courts would allow a woman
to act with impunity toward the fetus up until that time. California
and Minnesota courts adopted the reasonable parent standard for an
explicit reason: a parent should be judged in all of her actions to-
ward her child and not escape liability based on parental immunity.
Rather, she should avoid liability if her actions were reasonable
under the circumstances.189 It will be difficult for the courts to avoid
modifying the prenatal recovery cause of action if they wish to fulfill
the main purpose of allowing a parent to be liable to her child for
tortious acts.
186. CAL. CIv. CODE § 29 (West 1982). This code section appears to allow recov-
ery for prenatal injuries from the time of conception if the child is subsequently born
alive. But California's Third Appellate District seemed to believe that whether the fetus
was viable would be a factor in determining whether the child, born alive, had a cause of
action. Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 636, 92 P.2d 678, 681 (1939); Nor-
man v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 98, 268 P.2d 178, 180 (1954) (affirms its holding
in Scott by way of dicta). See also Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 363, 371, 38
N.W.2d 838, 841 (1949) (allowed wrongful death recovery of viable fetus); Pehrson v.
Kistner, 301 Minn. 299, 302, 222 N.W.2d 334, 336 (1974) (allowed wrongful death
recovery of a viable fetus).
187. See supra notes 175-177 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 174. The main concern of the critics of this standard are ar-
guably not present in this type of action. However, it could be argued that ethnic, cul-
tural, and religious beliefs may affect the type of prenatal care a woman will follow; a
jury may have an unrealistic view of how a woman should care for her body during this
period of fetal development. In addition, the possible problem of financial inability to
obtain proper prenatal care could become an issue.
189. See supra notes 175-177 and accompanying text.
The Complete Abolition of Parental Immunity
Eight states do not recognize the doctrine of parental immunity.190
Of the eight, only the Vermont Supreme Court has alluded to the
possible difficulties of allowing unlimited liability of a parent. It
stated at the end of an opinion, almost as an afterthought, "[T]here
is a great variation from state to state upon the right of recovery, as
contrasted to the right to sue, according to the nature of the claim,
the agency of the injury or even the presence or absence of insur-
ance. These decisions must wait the development of the facts." 191
The Vermont court apparently acknowledges that the failure to rec-
ognize parental immunity does not create legal duties and that the
nature and the extent of the parent's liability will have to be devel-
oped on a case-by-case basis.
All eight states allow prenatal injury recovery at least from the
point of viability of the fetus.192 Despite the unrestricted holdings of
these states regarding parental immunity, it may be foolhardy to
surmise that they will allow a cause of action by a child born alive
against its mother for prenatal injuries. None of these jurisdictions
have been confronted with the explicit issue of what the legal duty of
a parent is. They have not been forced to delineate whether the duty
of a parent to a child is the same duty owed by the public at large. If
there is a recognized duty of a third party to the child, does this
same general duty apply to the parent, or will the duty be more or
less restrictive? The issue could be restated as whether the classifica-
tion of "parent" is legally significant in defining the duty.193
Additionally, if the act of the parent is peculiar to the parent-child
relationship, will the courts maintain there has always been such a
190. Petersen v. City of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 487-88, 462 P.2d 1007, 1009
(1970); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 404-05, 528 P.2d 1013, 1018 (1974); Briere v.
Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 436, 224 A.2d 588, 590 (1966). See also Sargent v. Ross, 111
N.H. 388, 396, 308 A.2d 528, 533 (1973) (interprets Briere as abolishing parental im-
munity); Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 96 N.M. 27, 31, 627 P.2d 869, 871 (1981); Nuelle v.
Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364, 366-67 (N.D. 1967); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 382-83, 282
A.2d 351, 357 (1971); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 137, 268 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1980);
Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 121-22, 370 A.2d 191, 193 (1977).
191. Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 122, 370 A.2d 191, 193 (1977) (emphasis
added).
192. North Dakota and Hawaii have not considered the issue. See supra note 45
and accompanying text. Weaks v. Mounter, 88 Nev. 118, 123-24, 493 P.2d 1307, 1309
(1972) (dicta); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 534, 458 P.2d 617, 621 (1969) (allowed
wrongful death action of a viable fetus); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 486, 147
A.2d 108, 110 (1958); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 95 N.M. 150, 155, 619 P.2d 826,
828-29 (1980); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 273-74, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960); Fowler
v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 612-13, 138 S.E.2d 42, 43-44 (1964); Vaillancourt v. Medi-
cal Center Hosp. of Vt., 139 Vt. 138, 141, 425 A.2d 92, 95 (1980).
193. Hurst v. Titus, 77 A.D.2d 157, 159-60, 432 N.Y.S.2d 938, 940 (1980)
(mother held liable for starting a fire on the stove which injured the minor child; the duty
was defined on the basis that the mother breached a duty owed to the world at large).
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duty, or will they possibly acknowledge that abolishing parental im-
munity did not create new duties? If they recognize a duty, there is
no guarantee that some courts will opt for a "reasonable parent"
standard. Some may refuse to recognize a duty for certain parental
duties covered by child abuse, neglect, and dependency statutes. The
essence of this analysis is that in individual cases, the courts may
revert to a case-by-case approach, a Goller exception rationale, or
even a "reasonable parent" standard when confronted by specific
factual situations which arise out of the unique relationship of parent
and child.
THE DUTY OF A WOMAN TO THE EMBRYO-FETUS
Even if the courts are willing to recognize the standing of a fetus
to sue and to abolish the parental immunity doctrine, liability for the
mother of an injured fetus is not automatic. The courts must first
recognize a duty on the part of a woman to her fetus that can be
equitably and uniformly applied.
Recognition of the Duty
The Michigan Appellate Court in Grodin recognized a duty on the
part of a woman to her fetus from the time of conception. She will
be held to a standard of conduct similar to that of a third party
requiring her to refrain from negligent conduct that results in inju-
ries to a fetus who is subsequently born alive. A breach of that duty
will result in liability to the child.1' The question remains whether
the other state court jurisdictions will also recognize such a duty.
This article has established that thirty jurisdictions would be recep-
tive to the recognition of a duty owed by a woman to her embryo-
fetus.195
The majority of jurisdictions should recognize such a duty to re-
main consistent with their policy justifications as set. forth in their
decisions abolishing parental immunity and recognizing the right of
a child born alive to recover for prenatal injuries. Allowing children
a cause of action against their parents is no longer seen in and of
itself as threatening the family unit. 96 The injury sustained and the
lack of compensation is viewed as more of a threat to the integrity of
the family unit.19 7 In the prenatal recovery cases, difficulty of proof
194. 102 Mich. App. at 400, 301 N.W.2d at 870-71.
195. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
196, See supra notes 77, 119, 135, 170, 184-185.
197. See supra notes 86-87, 119-121, 175-176, 190-191.
has been rejected as a valid basis for denying the cause of action. 98
It is almost universally accepted that a child forced to live with
deformities for his entire life is entitled to compensation whether the
injuries occurred prior to or after birth.
The major reservation of all courts that have opted for less than
complete abrogation of immunity has been the concern of "invading"
the family unit by dictating to parents how to raise their children. 99
The issue of prenatal injury to a fetus, however, is separate and dis-
tinct, and totally removed from the issue of parent-child supervision.
The only effect a suit of this kind has on the parent-child relation-
ship is due to the time and trouble of pursuing the suit itself. As
stated above, the courts no longer recognize this as legally signifi-
cant. In fact, the suit fulfills the goal of compensating the child born
alive for the violation of his right to be free of negligently inflicted
prenatal injuries while at the same time strengthening the family
unit by freeing it of the continuing obligations of supporting the dis-
abled child.
The replenishment of financial resources will only be true if insur-
ance is available, but a suit of this type generally will not be com-
menced unless such financial resources are available. Thus, it would
be totally inconsistent with the modern trend of cases for the courts
to refuse to recognize this cause of action. Any argument on a social
policy level in opposition to its recognition has already been ad-
vanced and rejected by the courts. However, the intellectual discus-
sion of social policy goals cannot always be transferred into a worka-
ble legal concept that can be applied by the courts in an equitable
and consistent manner.
Definition of the Duty. The Possibility of Prenatal Injury by the
Mother
Before discussing the parameters of the duty, it is necessary to
examine the possible injuries that might occur to the developing fe-
tus due to the negligence of the mother. In defining the boundaries
of the duty, it will be necessary to keep in mind the dangers against
which that duty is designed to guard. Therefore, one must turn to
the current medical knowledge regarding the woman's care of her
body and its effect on the development of the fetus.
It is now known that congenital defects can occur not only from
heredity, but from certain environmental factors called teratogens
which are any substance that causes developmental malfunctions or
monstrosities. Therefore, a child can be deformed as the sole result
of genetic inheritance or from teratogenic agents which are intro-
198. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 54, 75-77, 81-82, 108-111, 125-131, 159, 181, 191.
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duced into the woman's body during fetal development.200
The period of fetal development is commonly referred to by the
medical community as the gestation period.20 1 During this period of
gestation, the child undergoes a series of quite uniform and accu-
rately predictable changes. It is normally broken down into three
stages: the ovum, the embryo, and the fetus.202 In a layperson's
description of the developmental process, the first third of the gesta-
tion development is devoted to rapid development of all major organs
and systems in the body. The second stage concentrates on perfect-
ing the organ system and improving their intercommunication-the
ability to work together as a functioning whole. The third stage is
mainly concerned with the overall growth of the fetus and organs. 203
During the gestation period, the fetus can be injured by a physical
force inflicted upon a woman or from exposure of the woman to an
external teratogenic agent which enters her body and is transmitted
to the fetus through the placenta.204 Even though the fetus has a
distinct physiological individuality, the way in which it responds to
the mother's anatomic and metabolic environment is of critical im-
portance at every stage of development in determining if it will be
born a healthy, normal child or with congenital deformities.20 5
The greatest danger of inducing malformations of the fetus is dur-
ing the first trimester or third of the gestation period.20 6 During
those first few weeks of embryonic development, external influences
such as physical force applied to the embryo or teratogenic agents
introduced into the woman's body may cause congenital defects in
the embryo when those same influences may not injure a fully devel-
oped fetus.207 However, possible injury to the fetus is not limited to
the first trimester and external forces or teratogenic agents may af-
fect the fetus throughout the gestation period resulting in brain dam-
age, behavioral disturbances, growth retardation, and gross birth
defects.208
A woman must be cognizant of the fact that the application of
external force or trauma may ultimately injure the fetus. Externally
200. Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal
Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 554, 562 (1962).
201. 5B LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA § 37.2b, at 10.
202. Id. at 10-11.
203. Id. at § 37A.2, at 159.
204. Note, supra note 200, at 555.
205. Ament, supra note 1, at 25.
206. E. SANDBERG, SYNOPSIS OF OBSTETRICS 124 (10th ed. 1978).
207. Ament, supra note 1, at 25.
208. Id.
induced trauma upon the woman can result in inadequate fetal oxy-
genation or reduce maternal cardiac output so as to supply insuffi-
cient nourishment to the placenta for proper fetal development.09
Additionally, even though the fetus is well cushioned in the womb,
direct physical injury to the fetus can occur with severe trauma; a
woman should avoid dangerous activities with a high risk of severe
bodily harm.21 ° Current medical research firmly establishes that cer-
tain choices a woman makes as to the risk of harm to her own body
may in fact risk injuring the fetus.
The threat of direct physical harm to a fetus appears to be the
least of a woman's problem in protecting the fetus. The voluntary
introduction by the woman of teratogenic agents into her body dur-
ing the gestation period constitutes one of the greatest threats. In
particular, the use of certain drugs, prescription, non-prescription, or
illegal, poses one of the greatest threats. In fact, the recommended
standard medical practice advises that no drugs should be adminis-
tered during pregnancy unless the benefit to the woman clearly out-
weighs the possible detrimental effect on the fetus. It has been une-
quivocably established that many drugs cross the placenta and affect
the fetus.21'
The vulnerability to the drugs by the developing embryo or fetus
has been demonstrated repeatedly. Sedatives, tranquilizers, mor-
phine, heroin, and methadone may all lead to physical or mental de-
fects in a child.212 Congenital defects of the fetus due to the woman's
drug intake will occur most likely in the first trimester, and there is
the possibility of internal organ damage from the fourth month
on.213 Medical research has even found that common aspirin, which
was previously believed to be harmless, adversely affects the fetus.214
Another common "drug" which may have devastating effect is al-
cohol. Excessive alcohol intake by the woman during the gestation
period can produce abnormal changes in the fetus. Chronic alcohol-
ism may lead to fetal maldevelopment which is commonly referred
to as fetal alcohol syndrome. 1 5 This heavy intake of alcohol may
result in physical growth and mental retardation, particularly to the
crainofacial area, the child's limbs, and cardiovascular system. 21 6
One study has even suggested there may be adverse effects to the
209. J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, supra note 2, at 177-83.
210. Id. at 318.
211. MacDonald, Pregnancy, in ATTORNEYS' TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE § 305.11
(R. Gray, ed., 3rd ed. 1980).
212. E. SANDBERG, supra note 206, at 117-18.
213. C. BARNES, MEDICAL DISORDERS IN OBSTETRIC PRACTICE 484 (4th ed.
1974).
214. MacDonald, supra note 211, § 305.11.
215. J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, supra note 2, at 320.
216. E. SANDBERG, supra note 206, at 118.
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fetus if the woman had been an alcoholic, but had stopped drinking
during pregnancy.217
The pregnant woman who smokes tobacco may also be harming
the fetus. It is known that women who smoke tend to have children
with a lower birth weight. 18 It appears that smoking impairs fetal
growth, and the more cigarettes that are smoked during the gesta-
tion period, the greater the impairment of fetal growth.2 19 Further
research in the area may lead to discoveries of other adverse effects
on the fetus, but a woman is now discouraged from smoking during
the pregnancy as it impairs the fetus' chance for a successful birth,
and can lead to serious complications or injuries to the child which
may be fatal during delivery.2
The effects of sexually transmitted diseases can be harmful to the
fetus. If the woman contracted syphilis before, at the time of, or
after conception, it may cause developmental problems in the fe-
tus. 221 Herpes Genitalis is especially devastating and it is advised
that even after cure a woman should use contraceptives with long
term follow-up care before attempting to conceive a child due to the
high probability of adverse effects upon fetal development.222
A number of common diseases contracted by a woman prior to, at
the time of, or after conception may cause congenital defects. Ru-
bella, or German measles, has been shown to cause congenital abnor-
malities if the disease occurs in the first trimester. It is highly recom-
mended that a prospective mother be vaccinated prior to conception
to prevent the likelihood of contracting certain diseases.223
A woman may be endangering the embryo or fetus even when she
is attempting to prevent conception. Failure in the diagnosis of preg-
nancy frequently occurs in the early stages after conception. 2 If a
woman is using oral contraceptives during early pregnancy, there is
a possibility that congenital defects in the fetus may occur. Even
though the cause and effect has not been firmly established, the med-
ical community strongly recommends that a woman stop using oral
contraceptives until it can be established that she is not pregnant.22 5
217. J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, supra note 2, at 321.
218. R. BENSON, HANDBOOK OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 126 (7th ed.
1980).
219. J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, supra note 2, at 942.
220. MacDonald, supra note 211, § 305.12.
221. R. BENSON, supra note 218, at 516-17.
222. Id. at 529-30.
223. Id. at 363.
224. J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, supra note 2, at 261.
225. Id. at 1019.
Finally, a woman may expose the fetus to possible injury when
working in the home or in the workplace. It has been verified that
cooking gas in excessive amounts, lead, mercury, arsenic, copper,
phosphorous, bromill, and iodide are all capable of damaging the fe-
tus if these substances enter a woman's body.2 26 If a woman is ex-
posed to these substances on a regular basis either at home or at
work, she is possibly endangering normal fetal development which
may result in congenital deformities.
In reviewing the current medical literature, it is undisputed that a
woman may place her child, or more appropriately, the embryo or
fetus, in a position of peril which may result in physical or mental
harm. The potential for injury is not limited to the time of concep-
tion, but may occur prior to conception and throughout her preg-
nancy. More importantly, or more legally significant, is that the ma-
jority if not all of these risks can be eliminated if the woman is
aware of the dangers and takes the necessary steps to prevent fetal
exposure. In order to do this, the woman can take affirmative action
to prevent risks, such as being vaccinated, but she may also have to
severely alter her occupational or personal life even before concep-
tion to eliminate the risks enumerated above. Even if the risk of ex-
posure is not present until after conception, the difficulty of detecting
early pregnancy may force a woman to alter her lifestyle for a signif-
icant period of time before conception.
Thus, medical experts will be able to establish in many cases that
the woman's actions resulted in harm to the fetus. The scope of a
woman's duty not to harm her fetus is explored in the following sec-
tion which contains a discussion of an equitable duty rule.
The Parameters of the Duty
Even though public policy favors recognizing a woman's duty to
protect her embryo-fetus, from the point of conception,227 the ability
of the courts to define the duty may prohibit its recognition or se-
verely limit the scope of the duty to fetuses that are in a viable state.
Medical science has established the ovum-embryo-fetus as a sepa-
rate, independent organism from that of the mother, but the ability
to determine when conception occurs and when the fetus is viable is
not so easily determined on a consistent basis.2 28 These problems do
in fact go to the issues of proof, but more importantly they are an
integral part of the determination of the commencement of the duty.
A legal duty does not exist merely because a court extends it to
226. M. MONTAGU, PRENATAL INFLUENCES 357-58 (1962).
227. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 37 and accompanying text; see infra notes 242-245 and ac-
companying text.
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the particular situation in order to arrive at the result it seeks. There
must be some relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant
from which the duty can be said to arise. The plaintiff must have
some right which the defendant has some obligation to protect. This
right defines the limits of the defendant's duty. 29 The right recog-
nized in all prenatal cases has been the right to be born free of
mental and physical defects. The judicial concern has focused on
the "relationship." The issue is whether a tortfeasor can have a le-
gally recognized "relationship" with something which is conceived
but not yet born alive.
As the courts have indicated, tort law traditionally required the
imposition of a duty only when the tortfeasor acts toward a determi-
nate person or human being.230 The courts first rejected a fetus as a
determinate person or as having legal personality even if born
alive.231 Later, the majority recognized the fictional relationship be-
tween the actor and the viable fetus, 2 which made sense when the
fetus could live outside the womb even though it did not. The exten-
sion of liability to the previable fetus was more a product of diffi-
culty of justification and application than a strict adherence to the
determination of a legal relationship with a determinate person. No
one would argue that a previable fetus is capable of independently
living outside the womb, for it is the antithesis of the definition of
previability.
A pragmatic analysis seems to be that the courts have determined
that once the child is born alive, it is a specific human being deserv-
ing of compensation regardless of whether it was a separate entity at
the time the injury was inflicted.2 3 The legal fiction of the existence
of a relationship between the tortfeasor and the fictional plaintiff is
apparently acceptable to the courts after conception because some-
thing exists regardless of whether one agrees it is a human being or
not.
The court as a matter of law will determine when the fetus has
suffered an invasion of its bodily integrity and is entitled to legal
protection.& In the recognition of this duty, a court must set forth,
according to general tort principles, what the standard of conduct is
for the particular duty. While the duty may vary in each common
229. Pace, supra note 21, at 147.
230. Comment, supra note 26, at 218.
231. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
233. W. PROSSER, supra note 24, § 53, at 326-27.
234. Id., § 37 at 206 (existence of a duty in a negligence case is a question of law).
law jurisdiction, the general standard of conduct would be what a
reasonable and prudent person would do under the same or similar
circumstances. 235 An additional related requirement of a duty is that
it is reasonably foreseeable that the acts of the tortfeasor will injure
the plaintiff. The consequences of one's acts could go on for eternity
and the controversy as to how far the common law will allow liability
to be imposed236 is centered on the argument of what is reasonably
foreseeable. 237
This argument has raged under the labels of "duty" and "proxi-
mate cause" by courts and legal commentators, but as William Pros-
ser has stated, the issues are the same:
[I]t must be repeated that the question is in no way one of causation and
never arises until causation has been established. It is rather one of the,
fundamental policies of the law, as to whether the defendant's responsibility
should extend to such results."8'
Therefore, the issue that will confront the courts is to determine
when, once the medical community can find the causal relationship
between the injuries of the child and the acts of a woman after con-
ception and during prenatal development, a woman's responsibility
should extend to such a result as a matter of public policy.
The crux of this decision will be whether the courts will hold as a
matter of public policy that a woman should be held to a standard of
conduct toward her own body long before the actual duty arises due
to her continuing ability to conceive. Because of the fictional rela-
tionship that will be imposed between a woman and a "being" inside
of her own body, the problem of knowledge of the existence of that
being will be paramount.
The standard of conduct which a community demands must be an
external and objective one.2 39 One of the most difficult questions is
what the actor may be required to know. 24 0 The minimum standard
of knowledge is based upon what is common knowledge in the com-
munity. 41 A standard which assumes a woman knows when she has
conceived may result in the imposition of a duty on a woman to use
235. Id.
236. The courts have universally recognized that in order to establish that a person
is liable or negligent there must be:
(1) a duty recognized to conform to a certain standard of conduct,
(2) a breach of duty which is the failure to conform to the standard,
(3) a reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting
injury, and(4) actual loss or damage resulting to interests of another.
Id. § 30.
237. Id., § 53, at 326-27.
238. Id., § 43, at 250.
239. Id., § 32, at 150.
240. Id. at 157.
241. Id. at 159-60.
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care in the treatment of her body long before conception actually
occurs.
The early stages of pregnancy are difficult to diagnose with any
degree of certainty. There are only subtle changes during the first
month of pregnancy.242 Most frequently, mistakes in diagnosis are
made in the first several weeks of pregnancy.243 Within two weeks
after the first missed menstrual period, tests can be 95% to 98% ac-
curate in detecting pregnancy.244 However, there are three positive
signs of pregnancy which are: (1) fetal heart action separate and
distinct from the mother's own heart action; (2) perception of active
fetal movement; and (3) recognition of the fetus radiologically.
These tests are only valid at nineteen weeks, twenty weeks, and six-
teen weeks after conception respectively. 45 It is apparent then, that
a woman cannot be reliably informed that she is in fact pregnant
until weeks after conception.
Additionally, there are factors which commonly prevent a woman
from going to a physician to determine if she is pregnant. It has been
well documented that fear and apprehension are commonly associ-
ated with a woman's first impression that she is pregnant even if she
wants the child. This includes the fear of the unknown, fear of the
pain during labor and delivery, fear of death, fear of economic con-
sequences of pregnancy and motherhood, resentment of the immi-
nent loss of personal independence and attractiveness, resentment of
the child as a potential competitor for the husband's love and affec-
tion, and uncertainty about the parental role.246
At the same time one considers these factors, the medical commu-
nity recommends that well before pregnancy, comprehensive health
care of the mother should be provided to benefit not only her, but to
benefit the health of the child-to-be as well.24 Such a program of
care should start as soon as a pregnancy is anticipated.24 1 Dangerous
activities that could risk bodily harm should be prohibited and the
introduction of high risk external substances like alcohol and other
drugs into the woman's body should cease. 249 As established earlier,
242. 5B LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 24, § 37.3a, at 13.
243. J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, supra note 2, at 261-62.
244. 5B LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 24, § 37.3a, at 13.
245. J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, supra note 2, at 261-62.
246. R. BENSON, supra note 218, at 447-48.
247. J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, supra note 2, at 304.
248. Id. at 305.
249. Id. at 318-21.
the fetus is most susceptible to injury during the first trimester. 50
All of these factors can cause a great degree of uncertainty in
determining when the mother has a duty to refrain from acts which
may ultimately injure the fetus. It can be argued that this is merely
a proof question: how much proof is necessary for the jury to deter-
mine when in fact the mother knew or should have known that she
was pregnant? This argument may be valid for a planned pregnancy
where the mother has on-going prenatal or even preconception medi-
cal care and where she is informed by her attending physicians of
the inherent risks of exposing her body to the possibility of physical
harm or drug use which will ultimately harm the fetus. However,
even in the situation of a "planned" pregnancy the problems are
obvious.
Will the courts hold a mother to a standard of conduct to refrain
from using her own body as she pleases if she is attempting to be-
come pregnant and knows of the inherent dangers, but she and her
mate are unsuccessful for weeks, months, or even years? What is
common knowledge to the community, or to the community of pro-
spective mothers, on how a woman can use or abuse her body during
the time she is trying to get pregnant and cannot confirm it? Is it
customary for all prospective mothers to seek preconception medical
care and advice?
There is a general rule in tort law that engaging in certain activi-
ties, or standing in certain types of relationships to others, will obli-
gate the actor to rid herself of ignorance. In other words, liability
may be imposed on a woman for remaining ignorant by failing to
make intelligent inquiry as to what she does not know.251 If a couple
intends to have a child, do we require the woman to seek out infor-
mation on what she should or should not do to her body during the
time she may be pregnant and does not know it?
All of these questions pertain to the intended or planned preg-
nancy. The issue becomes further complicated by the unintended
pregnancy. If contraceptive devices fail or if the woman herself, or in
agreement with her partner, prefers for neither of them to use con-
traceptive devices, should the woman be held to the same standard
of conduct as a woman who intends to use abortion as a contracep-
tive device, but then determines she wants to have the child? At
what point does she have a duty not to injure the fetus?
The ramifications of exactly what point in time the woman will be
subject to a duty to the embryo-fetus will have a dramatic impact on
the ability of a woman to use her body as she pleases. If she is sub-
ject to liability from the point when she intends to have the child or
250. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
251. W. PROSSER, supra note 24, § 32, at 160.
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from the point when she fails to prevent conception but with no par-
ticular intent to conceive, a woman will be subject to stringent stan-
dards of conduct not otherwise required of the public in general.
This argument would be moot if the woman knew or could have
known exactly when conception occurred, but due to the normal time
lag before she does know, these issues are particularly relevant.
Whether the courts, as a matter of public policy, want to subject a
woman to a standard of conduct for possibly long periods of time
because she might be pregnant and might injure the fetus is
controversial.
This controversy is imminent because the particular standard of
conduct in a single case will be based on what conduct of the woman
was reasonable under the particular circumstances vis-a-vis the em-
bryo-fetus. This question in our common law courts is to be deter-
mined in all doubtful cases by the jury. The public insists that its
conduct be judged in part by the person on the street rather than by
lawyers or judges. 2 Any competent trial lawyer will argue to a jury
that if a woman is not using contraception during intercourse, she
knew or should have known that she could conceive. As a matter of
public policy, the courts must decide if this question should be left to
the jury for a case-by-case determination.
One may argue that public policy demands that a woman be sub-
jected to this standard if she chooses not to use some form of contra-
ception. It is logical to impose liability when the mother acting rea-
sonably knew or should have known she was pregnant. It is difficult
to know when conception occurs, but it does not seem unreasonable
for a woman to act in such a way that will protect a fetus if she is
capable of conception. Also, if the gravity of harm to the fetus is
greatest in the first trimester, the embryo-fetus' rights are being se-
verely compromised if the woman can act with impunity until she
actually knows she is pregnant.
Therefore, the courts which protect the fetus from the point of
conception have a workable standard by imposing a reasonable stan-
dard of conduct on the woman for the benefit of the fetus. However,
the multiple problems of (1) the medical uncertainty of diagnosis of
conception in the first trimester; (2) when a woman should reasona-
bly know she might be pregnant and seek medical advice with the
attendant psychological factors mitigating against early diagnosis;
and (3) whether the standard is different for women intending to
252. Id., § 37, at 207.
become pregnant from women merely capable of becoming pregnant,
may cause the courts to accept the time of actual knowledge of preg-
nancy to be the point when they impose a legal duty of care.
The public policy debate will be between the protection of the fe-
tus during the period it is most susceptible to injury and the willing-
ness of the state to impose a standard of conduct on a woman during
what could be a substantial period of time when she is in fact not
pregnant. Thus, the theoretically simple standard of "knew or should
have known" becomes in reality very complex, which if left to a jury
on a case-by-case basis, could result in extremely disparate determi-
nations of when in fact the legal duty of care attached to the woman.
The critical importance of when the duty attaches cannot be cloaked
in the issue of difficulty of proof in individual cases, but is an issue of
law in applying a standard to a class of individuals in a consistent,
reasonable manner.
If one is dealing with a jurisdiction where prenatal recovery is only
allowed from the point of viability, the problem of knowledge of
pregnancy is probably not present except in a minority of cases. The
major problem will be one of public policy of continuing to allow a
woman to act with impunity to the fetus for a certain period of its
growth, and then arbitrarily imposing a strict standard of conduct
after the period the fetus was most susceptible to injury. Along with
the inherent problems due to the nebulous concept of viability,253 the
courts adhering to the viability standard may be quickly forced to
reject it with the option of confronting the multiple problems of ap-
plying a point-of-conception standard.
The issue becomes further complicated in those states allowing re-
covery for prenatal injuries caused by preconception acts. One com-
mentator has set forth the scenario of a thirteen-year-old child's use
of illegal drugs which ultimately cause defective internal organs in a
child born seven years later.254 The issue is again one of which stan-
dard of knowledge will be thrust upon the prospective mother. This
ultimately dictates a standard of conduct as to the use of her body
prior to the conception of the child. In this situation, the tension be-
tween a woman's freedom of bodily integrity and a fetus' right to be
well-born becomes immense for the prospective mother in making
decisions at a time when she most likely has not even considered
whether or not to have a child. This could cause a woman to be
subject to a standard of conduct for her entire lifetime prior to the
conception of her child which could result in legal liability.
Not even considering what knowledge a woman had or should
253. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
254. Note, Preconception Tort-The Need for a Limitation, 44 Mo. L. REV. 143,
149 (1979).
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have had, the issue of foreseeability is paramount. From common
experience, it can probably be assumed that all women desire to have
a child at some point in their lives; if not, they at least desire the
freedom to choose whether or not to conceive. The mere desire to
have a child may mean a woman should reasonably foresee that how
she treats her body throughout her lifetime could ultimately injure
her child. The logic of this argument may be consistent with the
protection of the child to be well-born, but borders on the nonsensi-
cal in reality. An alternative may be the imposition of a duty to de-
termine at the time one intends to become pregnant whether any
prior acts may now result in exposing the fetus to injury. Again, the
question arises as to whether such a duty can be imposed on a
woman who merely fails to prevent conception and after becoming
pregnant decides to allow the pregnancy to continue.
The ultimate issue in determining the definition or scope of the
duty is determining matters of public policy in light of a woman's
constitutional right to abort a fetus. If a mother has injured a fetus
which is known to definitely exist, and if she is still allowed to abort,
the state may be encouraging the termination of prospective life. If a
woman desires to take the chance that, due to her acts before or
after conception, she may give birth to a deformed child, should the
state encourage her to accept that burden, or should it add a factor
mitigating against it by imposing the possibility of a lawsuit by her
child after birth?
A credible criticism of these concerns would be that since a suit
would probably never occur without insurance being available, it is
not realistic to assume a woman would ever consider the question.
Yet, it cannot be readily assumed that the public policy determina-
tions of a court will be realized; a court may be concerned merely
with appearing to condone or encourage a certain type of conduct.
The ultimate question appears to be whether the state should have
the right to impose liability upon a woman if she knowingly desires
to take the chance of having a defective child knowing she will love,
care for, and nurture that child to the same degree if not more than
if it were healthy.
These problems are most aptly summed up by William Prosser in
The Law of Torts:
It is fundamental that the standard of conduct which is the basis of the
law of negligence is determined by balancing the risk in the light of the
social value of the interest threatened, and the probability and extent of the
harm, against the value of the interest which the actor is seeking to protect,
and the expedience of the course pursued.2 5
All of these considerations are applicable to the determination of
whether to impose a duty upon a woman for the health and well-
being of her child.256 The issue that must be addressed is whether
the child's "right" to be well-born is important enough to severely
compromise a woman's right to use her body as she pleases.
CONCLUSION
The Michigan appellate court in Grodin v. Grodin257 recognized
that by allowing prenatal injury recovery and by abolishing parental
immunity, a child born alive would be able to recover against its
mother for prenatal injuries caused by her acts. However, the recog-
nition of this duty by the state courts will have tremendous implica-
tions for the women of this country and how they conduct their eve-
ryday lives.
255. W. PROSSER, supra note 24, § 32, at 149.
256. A review of the United States Supreme Court decisions relating to right of
privacy does not help clarify whether recognizing a cause of action between mother and
child has constitutional implications. It is suggested that if there is a constitutional issue,
it depends upon the point in the gestation process that liability attaches to the woman for
her negligent acts toward the fetus. This issue is better left for further analysis if and
when another jurisdiction follows Grodin.
257. 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980).
